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Modern operating systems are often the target of attacks that exploit vulnerabilities to
escalate their privilege level. Recently introduced hardening features prevent attackers from
using traditional kernel exploitation methodologies and force them to employ techniques
that were originally designed for user space exploitation —such as code reuse— to execute
arbitrary code with elevated privileges. In this dissertation, we present novel protection
mechanisms that render such methodologies ineffective and improve the security of today’s
operating systems. Specifically, we present solutions that prevent the leakage and corruption
of kernel code pointers without employing entities that execute on super-privileged mode
(e.g., hypervisors). The leakage of code pointers is an essential step for the construction
of reliable code reuse exploits and their corruption is typically necessary for mounting the
attack. More concretely, we present the design and implementation of two systems: kR^X
and kSplitStack.
kR^X is a system that diversifies the code layout to thwart attackers from constructing
code reuse exploits statically. It also prevents the leakage of return addresses through XOR-
based encryption or by hiding them among decoys (fake pointers to instructions that trap the
kernel when executed). Finally, it couples the above with a self-protection mechanism that
prevents attackers from leaking the diversified code layout, either by instrumenting every
memory read instruction with range checks on x86-64 systems or by imposing limits through
the segmentation unit on x86 systems. Evaluation results show that it imposes small runtime
overhead on real-world applications when measured on legacy x86-64 systems (~3.63%) and
significantly lower on x86 systems (~1.32%) and newer x86-64 CPUs that provide hardware
assistance (~2.32%).
kSplitStack, on the other hand, provides stronger protection against leaks of return
addresses and guarantees both their secrecy and their integrity by augmenting the isolation
mechanism of kR^X on x86-64 systems. This is achieved through a split stack scheme:
functions use an unprotected stack for their local variables but switch to a protected one
when pushing or poping return addresses. Moreover, kSplitStack protects the secrecy and
integrity of control data (e.g., the value of the instruction pointer) in interrupt contexts by
redirecting them to protected stacks, thus thwarting attackers from leaking or corrupting
code pointers by inducing interrupts or other hardware events. Finally, the evaluation
of kSplitStack shows that it imposes a small runtime overhead, comparable to the one
of kR^X, both on legacy x86-64 systems (~3.66%) and on newer CPUs with hardware
assistance (~2.50%).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The abundance and diversity of vulnerabilities in Operating System (OS) kernels [147] have
made them the target of privilege escalation attacks for over a decade [36, 180]. Tradi-
tionally, attackers targeted user space applications that run with system privileges (e.g.,
servers) to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges [161]. However after the adop-
tion of a number of user space defenses [46, 143, 152, 153] in modern OSes, they turned
their attention to kernel exploitation since exploiting user space applications became signif-
icantly more complex and challenging [7]. This turn was further motivated by the limited
number of privileged user space applications due to the enforcement of the least privilege
principle [167].
In contrast, when targeting the kernel attackers take advantage of its ubiquitous presence
in the system execution, which allows them to interact with it from any running user space
application (regardless of its privilege level). Additionally, targeting the kernel allows them
to exploit the large attack surface [123] that it exposes due to its complex (low level) code
base —which spans in tens of millions lines of code [44]— and execute arbitrary code with
elevated privileges. Upon successful exploitation, an attacker has an abundance of options
since she can corrupt security sensitive data structures to elevate the privileges of user space
processes [117, 196], jailbreak devices [1], escape sandboxes [166], disable security protection
features [118] or add new privileged users [73].
Kernel software and user space applications suffer from similar types of vulnerabil-
ities since they are written using similar low-level programming languages. The Linux
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kernel, in 2017 alone, was diagnosed with race conditions [218, 221, 222], buffer over-
flows [212, 215, 230, 232], use-after-free bugs [217, 229], integer errors [220, 237], memory
corruption and memory disclosure vulnerabilities [216, 219, 228, 231, 238], while similar
vulnerabilities were found for different kernel vendors (e.g., Windows [213, 214, 233–236],
Apple [223–227]). This trend continued in 2018 with over 750 vulnerabilities diagnosed [147].
Attackers traditionally exploited such vulnerabilities using kernel specific techniques based
on the shared virtual memory layout between the kernel and user space processes [109], how-
ever a number of recently introduced defenses [39, 109, 154, 156, 178, 200], such as SMEP
and SMAP, render these techniques ineffective. As a consequence, new kernel exploits em-
ploy techniques that rely on redirecting the execution flow to arbitrary code locations using
indirect branch instructions. Exploits of this type hijack indirect branches to stitch together
a sequence of carefully selected code snippets that (when executed) perform the desired ar-
bitrary computation. Since these code snippets are part of the legitimate kernel code, this
technique —known as code reuse— is impervious to the aforementioned defenses or the
W^X policy [132, 185]. Additionally, kernel-space Address Space Layout Randomization
(KASLR) [59], a probabilistic defense that randomizes the base address of the kernel, has
been shown to be bypassable [93, 100, 106, 134] therefore it does not reliably protect against
this type of attacks. To make matters worse, a more powerful strain of this attack, known as
Just-In-Time (JIT) code reuse [174] takes advantage of memory disclosure vulnerabilities
to dynamically leak the contents or the layout of executable pages, thus completely un-
dermining the effectiveness of KASLR. Finally, code reuse attacks are effective on multiple
architectures (as evidenced by their user space variant) such as x86/x86-64 [173], ARM [120]
and SPARC [19].
1.1 Hypothesis
The introduction of ret2usr defenses [39, 109, 154, 156, 178, 200] has forced attackers to
employ code reuse methodologies when constructing kernel exploits [1, 16, 166, 196, 198]
which, in turn, are impervious to these defenses as well as to the W^X policy [132, 185].
To this end, we hypothesize that the security of modern OSes can be improved by adopting
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self-protection mechanisms specifically tailored to the kernel setting that minimize the set
of code pointers an attacker can tamper with to reliably mount code reuse exploits.
1.2 Thesis Statement
This thesis argues that: (a) hiding code pointers, and (b) randomizing the code layout,
coupled with a memory isolation mechanism that guarantees the secrecy and the integrity
of the code and the hidden code pointers, can effectively and eﬀiciently protect OS kernels
against code reuse exploits.
1.3 Contributions
1. We present the design and implementation of kR^X: a system that protects commodity
OS kernels from code reuse attacks. kR^X is based on two pillars: a component that
randomizes the code layout and a component that enforces the execute-only memory
principle.
2. We introduce two novel return address protection schemes: (a) return address encryp-
tion, and (b) return address decoys. Both schemes prevent attackers from leaking
return addresses to infer the randomized code layout.
3. We introduce three execute-only memory enforcement mechanisms: (a) kR^X-SFI:
a software-only scheme; (b) kR^X-MPX: a hardware-assisted scheme which employs
Intel MPX [102], and (c) kR^X-SEG: a hardware-based scheme which relies on the
segmentation unit available in legacy systems.
4. We introduce kR^X-KAS, a new kernel space layout that facilitates the eﬀicient en-
forcement of execute-only memory. kR^X-KAS flips the kernel memory layout to place
all code sections on the top of the address space, therefore effectively creating two
disjoint regions: one that contains all kernel data sections and another that contains
all kernel code sections.
5. We implement kR^X as: (a) a kernel patch to enforce kR^X-KAS and kR^X-SEG, (b) a
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GCC plugin that enforces kR^X-SFI and kR^X-MPX, and (c) a GCC plugin that diver-
sifies the code layout and implements the two return address protection schemes. We
make all of the kR^X code publicly available.
6. We assess the effectiveness of kR^X using a real privilege escalation exploit that
employs the code reuse methodology targeting Linux kernels. We also adjust (aug-
ment) the exploit capabilities to perform direct and indirect Just-In-Time code reuse
methodologies. In all cases, kR^X was able to successfully detect and prevent the
respective exploitation attempt.
7. We evaluate the performance of kR^X using a set of macro- and micro-benchmarks.
Our system incurs small runtime overhead on x86-64 Linux kernels on real-life appli-
cations. The overhead drops to negligible when hardware-based XOM enforcement
mechanisms are employed both on x86 and x86-64 Linux kernels. The impact on
system call and I/O latency and bandwidth is moderate.
8. We present the design and implementation of kSplitStack: an x86-64 system that
augments kR^X to further increase the provided protection against code reuse attacks.
kSplitStack offers two distinct advantages compared to kR^X: it is not vulnerable to
race conditions vulnerabilities and it is able to protect a class of code pointers that
kR^X does not protect, namely code pointers emitted during hardware events.
9. We introduce the kSplitStack region, a region that is protected against arbitrary
memory disclosure and/or corruption vulnerabilities. The kSplitStack region is a
fundamental block of kSplitStack since it holds the sensitive code pointers that should
be protected (i.e., return addresses and hardware events code pointers).
10. We introduce a novel return address protection scheme based on relocation. It forces
the hardware to emit return addresses inside the split-stack region. This scheme
guarantees the integrity and secrecy of the protected return addresses in a race-free
manner, therefore it is an improvement compared to the aforementioned protection
schemes that are based on encryption and deception.
11. We assess the effectiveness of kSplitStack using the same set of exploits that we
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employed in the evaluation of kR^X. Additionally, we evaluate it against race condition
vulnerabilities that target return addresses and hardware events code pointers.
12. We evaluate the performance of kSplitStack using a set of macro- and micro-benchmarks.
We show that it provides better security guarantees than kR^X with a comparable
overhead both on legacy x86-64 systems and on newer CPUs with hardware assistance.
1.4 Dissertation Roadmap
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides background information about ker-
nel exploitation, code reuse attacks, and the design space af shadows stacks as a mitigation
against control flow hijacking attempts. Chapters 3 and 4 describe the design, implementa-
tion and evaluation (both in terms of performance and of security) of kR^X and kSplitStack
respectively. Finally, the thesis concludes in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Kernel Exploitation
Traditional kernel exploitation techniques rely on the shared memory layout imposed by
modern commodity OSes (e.g., Linux, Windows, BSDs). This layout places the kernel
and user space applications in different regions of the same address space and relies on
hardware assistance to prevent user space code (that executes in non-privileged mode)
from accessing the kernel code or data. Specifically, the different execution modes of the
CPU (i.e., protection rings) [107, 169] in conjunction with the Memory Management Unit
(MMU) ensure that less privileged —user space— code is unable to access memory pages
that belong to more privileged entities (e.g., the OS kernel). However, until recently, there
was no protection against accesses to user space pages from kernel code, a characteristic
that attackers exploited for many years when targeting the kernel. Specifically, kernel code
had full access to the complete address space to facilitate system calls, such as read()
and write(), which require unrestricted access to user space data pages. Additionally, the
privileged CPU modes do not prevent the execution of code that resides in user space code
pages.
Taking advantage of the above, local attackers traditionally exploited kernel software
using a technique called return-to-user (ret2usr) [109]. Attackers that employ this technique,
control a user space application and attempt to force the execution flow of the kernel
code to controlled user space pages that contain code of their choice to execute it with
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elevated privileges. To achieve this, attackers typically overwrite kernel code pointers such
as return addresses [171], function pointers [66, 68, 70, 71, 179], and dispatch tables [63,
69] with addresses that point to code that they injected in the user space portion of the
address space, so that the execution flow will be hijacked when these code pointers are
dereferenced. If control data corruption is not possible, attackers target pointers to sensitive
data structures in the kernel data sections (e.g., the heap) and redirect them to fake —user
space— copies [64, 65, 67, 72]. Typically, these data structures contain code pointers which,
in the fake copies, point to the user space code that the attacker wishes to execute [109].
ret2usr attacks take advantage of the weak separation of the user and kernel part of
the address space in most architectures. Due to the popularity of ret2usr attacks, recently
a number of defenses were proposed that provide strong isolation between the kernel and
the user portion of the address space. In this section we focus on defenses that protect
the Linux kernel on the x86/x86-64 architecture, even though other architectures have also
recently introduced hardening mechanisms against ret2usr attacks [3, 18].
2.1.1 Hardware-based Defenses
Modern Intel CPUs introduce two hardware features, called Supervisor Memory Execute
Protection (SMEP) [82] and Supervisor Memory Access Protection (SMAP) [101] that pro-
vide strong user-kernel segregation. Both features take advantage of the User/Supervisor
(U/S) bit in page table entries, that marks whether a page belongs to the OS kernel or to
a user space application. Specifically, while the CPU executes in privileged mode (ring 0),
SMEP detects attempts to execute code that resides in pages with the U/S bit set (i.e., that
belong to user space applications) and in such cases triggers page faults, thus preventing
the final step (arbitrary code execution) of ret2usr exploits. SMAP complements the above
protection by preventing memory accesses (reads/writes) to pages that belong to user space
applications, thus countering the second strain of ret2usr attacks that employs fake copies
of sensitive data structures. Note that both SMEP and SMAP are enabled by setting their
respective bits in the CR4 control register 1 and do not rely on the address space organi-
1CR4.SMEP and CR4.SMAP
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sation imposed by the OS (i.e., the fault is triggered regardless of the linear address of the
memory fetch).
2.1.2 Software-based Defenses
The PaX team [151] has developed two kernel hardening features that mitigate ret2usr
attacks, KERNEXEC (which prevents control-flow hijacking, similarly to SMEP) and UD-
EREF (which prevents memory accesses in user space, similarly to SMAP). Both KERNEXEC
and UDEREF have different designs for x86 and x86-64 due to architectural differences
(specifically due to the lack of enforcement of segmentation limits on x86-64). In x86, the
kernel portion of the address space is placed in one contiguous region. UDEREF then uses
the segmentation unit to prevent attempts to access memory outside the kernel region (i.e.,
the user space) result in general protection faults. In a similar manner, KERNEXEC limits
the CS segment so that instruction fetches from user space addresses are not allowed. In
x86-64, UDEREF unmaps the user space address range (upon entering kernel mode) and
remaps it in a different (shadow) area, which is mapped as non-executable. As a result,
attempts to dereference user space pointers —both data and code pointers— trigger page
faults since their respective pages are unmapped. On the other hand, KERNEXEC prevents
(only) control-flow hijacking using code instrumentation. Specifically, it makes use of the
GCC plugin interface and performs bit masking on function pointers and return addresses to
confine the execution to the kernel portion of the address space. kGuard [109] is also using
GCC plugins to inject control-flow assertions before every indirect branch to prevent exe-
cuting code from the user space. Additionally, it randomizes the location of those checks to
prevent attackers from bypassing them. Finally, Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI) [43],
previously KAISER [92], protects against ret2usr attacks since the user space portion of the
address space is marked as non-executable on every user-to-kernel context switch.
2.1.3 Kernel vs User Space Exploitation
Both kernel and user space software suffer from similar types of vulnerabilities since they
are written in similar, low-level programming languages [212–219, 221–236, 238]. Before
the introduction of the defenses described in Section 2.1, adversaries preferred taking ad-
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vantage of the weak segregation of the kernel and user space portion of the address space
when exploiting kernel vulnerabilities. However, after the strong segregation of the ad-
dress space portions, they are forced to retrofit user space exploitation methodologies in
the kernel setting. Fortunately, simple attacks such as code injection (e.g., through stack
smashing [149]) are not an option when exploiting a modern OS kernel: the presence of
kernel W^X [132, 185] mitigates such attempts. Instead, they are forced to employ more
sophisticated attacks such code reuse that we discuss in Section 2.2. Unfortunately, cur-
rent OS kernel defenses against such attacks are weaker than their user space counterparts:
KASLR [59] offers only 9 bits of entropy (on an x86-64 system) which is significantly less
than the 28 bits of entropy provided by user space ASLR.
2.2 Code Reuse Attacks And Defenses
Code reuse exploits rely on code fragments (gadgets) located at predetermined memory
addresses [23, 25, 55, 58, 86, 173]. Code diversification and randomization techniques (col-
loquially known as fine-grained ASLR [174]) can thwart code-reuse attacks by perturbing
executable code at the function [9, 111], basic block [57, 119, 193], or instruction [96, 150]
level, so that the exact location of gadgets becomes unpredictable [126].
However, Snow et al. introduced “just-in-time” ROP (JIT-ROP) [174], a technique for
bypassing fine-grained ASLR in applications with embedded scripting support. JIT-ROP is
a staged attack: first, the attacker abuses a memory disclosure vulnerability to recursively
read and disassemble code pages, effectively negating the properties of fine-grained ASLR
(i.e., the exact code layout becomes known to the attacker); next, the ROP payload is
constructed on-the-fly using gadgets collected during the first step.
Oxymoron [6] was the first protection attempt against JIT-ROP. It relies on (x86)
memory segmentation to hide references between code pages, thereby impeding the recursive
gadget harvesting phase of JIT-ROP. Along the same vein, XnR [5] and HideM [84] prevent
code pages from being read by emulating the decades-old concept of execute-only memory
(XOM) [34, 182] on contemporary architectures, like x86,2 which lack native support for
2In x86 (both 32- and 64-bit) the execute permission implies read access.
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XOM. XnR marks code pages as “Not Present,” resulting into a page fault (#PF) whenever
an instruction fetch or data access is attempted on a code page; upon such an event, the
OS verifies the source of the fault and temporarily marks the page as present, readable
and executable, or terminates execution. HideM leverages the fact that x86 has separate
Translation Lookaside Buffers (TLBs) for code (ITLB) and data (DTLB). A HideM-enabled
OS kernel deliberately de-synchronizes the ITLB from DTLB, so that the same virtual
addresses map to different page frames depending on the TLB consulted. Alas, Davi et
al. [54] and Conti et al. [31] showed that Oxymoron, XnR, and HideM can be bypassed
using indirect JIT-ROP attacks by merely harvesting code pointers from (readable) data
pages.
As a response, Crane et al. [48, 49] introduced the concept of leakage-resilient diversifi-
cation, which combines XOM and fine-grained ASLR with an indirection mechanism called
code-pointer hiding (CPH). Fine-grained ASLR and XOM foil direct (JIT-)ROP, whereas
CPH mitigates indirect JIT-ROP by replacing code pointers in readable memory with point-
ers to arrays of direct jumps (trampolines) to function entry points and return sites—CPH
resembles the Procedure Linkage Table (PLT) [142] used in dynamic linking; trampolines
are stored in XOM and cannot leak code layout. Readactor [48] is the first system to in-
corporate leakage-resilient code diversification. It layers CPH over a fine-grained ASLR
scheme that leverages function permutation [9, 111] and instruction randomization [150],
and implements XOM using a lightweight hypervisor.3
LR2 [17] is a defense system based on a self-protection mechanism that enforces XOM
on the code section. Alas, it is tailored to user programs running on mobile devices and
uses bit masking to confine memory reads to the lower half of the process address space.
Bit masking is not an attractive solution for the kernel setting; it requires canonical address
space layouts, which, in turn, entail extensive changes to the kernel memory allocators (for
coping with the imposed alignment constrains) and result in a whopping address space waste
(e.g., LR2 squanders half of the address space). KHide [83] on the other hand, protects the
3Readactor’s hypervisor makes use of the Extended Page Tables (EPT) feature [139], available in modern
Intel CPUs (Nehalem and later). EPT provides separate read (R), write (W), and execute (X) bits in nested
page table entries, thereby allowing the revocation of the read permission from certain pages.
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OS kernel against code reuse attacks, using a commodity VMM (KVM), however it does
not conceal return addresses, which is important for defending against indirect JIT-ROP
attacks [31].
SECRET [202] provides XOM-equivalent protection to COTS binaries, using memory
segmentation on x86 and information hiding on x86-64, while NORAX [29] leverages a
combination of MMU permission bits to retrofit XOM to ARM binaries. As a result,
they are only available to architectures that provide native support for marking memory
pages as execute-only. More importantly they rely on information hiding to guard against
direct JIT-ROP attacks, a strategy that has been shown to be ineffective in the kernel
setting [93, 99, 106, 134]. Lastly, they do not perform code diversification thus they do not
protect against any kind of attack that relies on pre-computed gadget addresses.
Live Re-randomization Giuffrida et al. [85] introduced modifications to MINIX so that
the system can be re-randomized periodically, at runtime. This approach is best suited for
microkernels, and not kernels with a monolithic design, while it incurs a significant runtime
overhead for short re-randomization intervals. TASR [11] re-randomizes processes each time
they perform I/O operations. However, it requires kernel support for protecting the nec-
essary bookkeeping information, and manually annotating assembly code, which is heavily
used in kernel context. Shuffler [195] and CodeArmor [28] re-randomize userland applica-
tions continuously, treating the OS kernel as part of their TCB. Lastly, RuntimeASLR [135]
re-randomizes the address space of service worker processes to prevent clone-probing attacks;
such attacks are not applicable to kernel settings.
Other Kernel Defenses KCoFI [50] augments FreeBSD with support for coarse-grained
CFI, whereas Fine-CFI [129] and the system presented by Ge et al. [79] rectify the enforce-
ment approach of HyperSafe [192] to implement a fine-grained CFI scheme for the kernels of
Linux and FreeBSD, and MINIX and FreeBSD, respectively. In addition, Fine-CFI further
improves the enforcement accuracy of Ge et al. by using points-to analysis to obtain a more
restricted set of possible targets for function pointers. In the same vein, PaX’s RAP [157]
provides a fine-grained CFI solution for the Linux kernel. However, though CFI schemes
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make the construction of ROP code challenging, they can be bypassed by confining the
hijacked control flow to valid execution paths [22, 55, 61, 86].
Heisenbyte [181] and NEAR [194] employ destructive code reads to thwart attacks that
rely on code disclosures (e.g., JIT-ROP). Alas, Snow et al. [175] demonstrated that destruc-
tive code reads can be undermined with code inference attacks. More recently, Pewny et
al. [160] further showed that inference attacks can employ whole-function reuse methodolo-
gies to bypass destructive code read-based protections, regardless of the underlying random-
ization. They also propose profiling the program to identify code and data, in an attempt
to minimize the code available for disclosure. Similarly to Heisenbyte and NEAR, their
system relies on a thin hypervisor that maps code as execute-only.
Li et al. [130] designed a system that renders ROP payloads unusable by eliminating
return instructions and opcodes from kernel code. Unfortunately, this protection can be
bypassed by using gadgets ending with different types of indirect branches [25, 86]. Chen et
al. [26] proposed PrivWatcher, a system that preserves the integrity of process credentials,
by placing them in read-only regions and employing a lightweight hypervisor to update them
when necessary. Song et al. proposed KENALI [176] to defend against data-only attacks.
KENALI enforces kernel data flow integrity [24] by categorizing data in distinguishing
regions (i.e., sets of data that can be used to influence access control); its imposed runtime
overhead is, however, very high (e.g., 100%–313% on LMBench). Finally, Li et al. [131]
note that zero-day vulnerabilities are significantly more common in code paths that are not
“popular” (i.e., exercised frequently). With this motivation, they propose Lind, a system
that re-creates complex OS functionality using only popular paths; similarly to KENALI,
the overhead of Lind is also very high (up to 525%).
2.3 Shadow Stacks
The concept of shadow stack was introduced almost two decades ago [189]. A shadow stack
is a safe virtual memory region that holds copies of the real return addresses to ensure their
integrity. Typically, when a function is called the return address is copied from the program
stack to the shadow stack. This copy is then compared with the address in the program
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stack when a function exits to detect corruption attempts. There are two major categories
in terms of how a shadow stack is designed: parallel [51] or compact [21]. Implementations
of the former category [51], place the shadow stack at a fixed offset from the program
stack. This design facilitates the quick mapping of return addresses and their corresponding
shadow stack copies at the expense of doubling the stack memory size. Implementations of
the latter category [30, 45, 56] employ a separate shadow stack pointer to hold the position
of the return address copies (e.g., in a register), while the location of the shadow stack is
not dependant on the location of the program stack. Even though maintaining a shadow
stack pointer incurs performance overhead, it requires less memory since the return address
copies are placed sequentially.
Another important design decision that affects the performance and effectiveness of a
shadow stack is the method that ensures the integrity of the copies. Solutions that rely
on hardware assistance [74, 144, 177] delegate this task to hardware features, while re-
cently Intel Control Enforcement Technology (CET) [103] was announced as an upcoming
hardware feature dedicated to providing hardware shadow stack support. Software only
solutions on the other hand employ either information hiding techniques to prevent at-
tackers from finding the address of the shadow stack [124, 136] or inline checks and bit
masking [124] such as Software Fault Isolation (SFI) [190] to ensure its integrity. Unfortu-
nately, recent attacks [62, 87, 88, 148] have undermined the security of information hiding,
while even the most optimized implementations of the latter impose non-negligible perfor-
mance penalty [172]. Finally, the recently introduced Intel Memory Protection Extensions
(MPX) [41] hardware feature can provide hardware-assisted SFI with minimal performance
overhead [21].




We present kR^X: a comprehensive and practical kernel hardening solution that diversifies
the kernel’s code and prevents any memory read accesses to it. More importantly, the latter
is achieved by following a self-protection approach that relies on code instrumentation to
apply checks inspired by SFI for preventing memory reads from code sections. Comprehen-
sive protection against kernel-level JIT-ROP attacks is achieved by coupling execute-only
memory with: i) extensive code diversification, which leverages function and basic block
reordering [111, 193], to thwart the direct use of pre-selected gadgets; and ii) return address
protection using either a XOR-based encryption scheme [17, 157, 195] or decoy return ad-
dresses, to thwart gadget inference through saved return addresses on the kernel stacks [31].
Practical applicability to existing systems is ensured given that kR^X: i) does not rely on
more privileged entities (e.g., a hypervisor [48, 83]) than the kernel itself; ii) is readily
applicable on x86 systems (both 32- and 64-bit), and can leverage support for memory
segmentation or protection (i.e., Intel’s MPX [102]) to optimize performance; iii) has been
implemented as a set of compiler plugins for the widely-used GCC compiler, and has been
extensively tested on recent Linux distributions; and iv) incurs a low runtime overhead (in
its full protection mode) of 4.04% on the Phoronix Test Suite, which drops to 2.32% when
MPX is available, and 1.32% when memory segmentation is in use.
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3.2 Threat Model
Adversarial Capabilities We assume unprivileged local attackers (i.e., with the ability to
execute, or control the execution of, user programs on the OS) who seek to execute arbitrary
code with elevated privileges by exploiting kernel-memory corruption bugs [165, 208, 209].
Attackers may overwrite kernel code pointers (e.g., function pointers, dispatch tables, return
addresses) with arbitrary values [71, 179], through the interaction with the OS via buggy
kernel interfaces. Examples include generic pseudo-filesystems (procfs, debugfs [37, 112]),
the system call layer, and virtual device files (devfs [122]). Code pointers can be corrupted
directly [71] or controlled indirectly (e.g., by first overwriting a pointer to a data structure
that contains control data and subsequently tampering with its contents [72], in a manner
similar to vtable pointer hijacking [168, 183]). Attackers may control any number of code
pointers and trigger the kernel to dereference them on demand. (Note that this is not equiv-
alent to an “arbitrary write” primitive.) Finally, we presume that the attackers are armed
with an arbitrary memory disclosure bug [204, 207]. In particular, they may trigger the
respective vulnerability multiple times, forcing the kernel to leak the contents of any kernel-
space memory address. Microarchitectural attacks, like Meltdown [134], Spectre [114], and
similar side-channel attacks [91], are considered out of scope.
Hardening Assumptions We assume an OS that implements the W^X policy [125, 132,
185] in kernel space.1 Hence, direct (shell)code injection in kernel memory is not attainable.
Moreover, we presume that the kernel is hardened against ret2usr attacks. Specifically, in
newer platforms, we assume the availability of SMEP (Intel CPUs) [200], whereas for legacy
systems we assume protection by KERNEXEC (PaX) [156] or kGuard [109]. In addition, we
assume sane (read-only) memory permissions for the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) and
Global Descriptor Table (GDT) [32, 76]. Finally, the kernel may have support for kernel-
space ASLR [59], stack-smashing protection [186], proper .rodata sections (constification
of critical data structures) [185], pointer (symbol) hiding [164], SMAP/UDEREF [39, 155],
page-table isolation (KPTI) [43, 92], or any other hardening feature. kR^X does not require
1In Linux, kernel-space W^X can be enabled by asserting the (unintuitive) DEBUG_RODATA and
DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX configuration options.
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or preclude any such features—they are orthogonal to our scheme(s). Data-only attacks,
such as page table tampering [127] or process credentials modification [198], are considered
out of scope; (self-)protecting such sensitive data structures [26, 52, 53] is also orthogonal
to kR^X.
3.3 Approach
Based on our hardening assumptions, kernel execution can no longer be redirected to code
injected in kernel space or hosted in user space. Attackers will have to therefore “com-
pile” their shellcode by stitching together gadgets from the executable sections of the ker-
nel [1, 16, 165, 196, 198] in a ROP [98, 173] or JOP [25] fashion, or use other similar code
reuse techniques [23, 55, 58, 86, 187], including (in)direct JIT-ROP [31, 54, 174]. kR^X
complements the work on user space leakage-resilient code diversification [17, 48] by pro-
viding a solution against code reuse for the kernel setting. The goal of kR^X is to aid
commodity OS kernels combat: (a) ROP/JOP and similar code reuse attacks [55, 58, 86],
(b) direct JIT-ROP, and (c) indirect JIT-ROP. To achieve that, it builds upon two main
pillars: (i) the R^X policy, and (ii) fine-grained KASLR.
3.3.1 R^X.
The R^X memory policy imposes the following property: memory can be either readable
or executable. Hence, by enforcing R^X on diversified kernel code, kR^X prevents direct
JIT-ROP attacks. Systems that enforce a comparable memory access policy (e.g., Readac-
tor [48], HideM [84], XnR [5]) typically do so through a hierarchically-privileged approach. In
particular, the OS kernel or a hypervisor (high-privileged code) provides the XOM capabili-
ties in processes executing in user mode (low-privileged code)—using memory virtualization
features (e.g., EPT; Readactor and KHide [83]) or paging nuances (e.g., #PF; XnR, TLB
de-synchronization; HideM). kR^X, in antithesis, enforces R^X without depending on a hy-
pervisor or any other more privileged component than the OS kernel. This self-protection
approach has increased security and performance benefits.
Virtualization-based (hierarchically-privileged) kernel protection schemes can be either
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retrofitted into commodity VMM stacks [83, 129, 158, 163] or implemented using special-
purpose hypervisors [48, 181, 191, 194]. The latter result in a smaller trusted computing base
(TCB), but they typically require nesting hypervisors to attain comprehensive protection.
Note that nesting occurs naturally in cloud settings, where contemporary (infrastructure)
VMMs are in place, and offbeat security features, like XOM, are enforced on selected appli-
cations by custom, ancillary hypervisors [48]. Unfortunately, nested virtualization cripples
scalability, as each nesting level results in ∼6–8% of runtime overhead [8], excluding the
additional overhead of the deployed protections.
The former approach is not impeccable either. Offloading security features (e.g., code
integrity [163], XOM [83], data integrity [191]) to commodity VMMs leads to a flat increase
of the virtualization overhead (i.e., “blanket approach;” no targeted or agile hardening),
and an even larger TCB, which, in turn, necessitates the deployment of hypervisor pro-
tection mechanisms [192, 201], some of which are implemented in super-privileged CPU
modes [4, 201]. Considering the above, and the fact that hypervisor exploits are becoming
an indispensable part of the attackers’ arsenal [80], we investigate a previously unexplored
point in the design space.
More specifically, our proposed self-protection approach to R^X enforcement: (a) does
not require VMMs [83] or software executing in super-privileged CPU modes [4]; (b) avoids
(nesting) virtualization overheads; and (c) is in par with recent industry efforts [33]. Lastly,
kR^X enables R^X capabilities even in systems that lack support for hardware-assisted
virtualization.
3.3.2 Fine-grained KASLR.
The cornerstone of kR^X is a set of code diversification techniques specifically tailored to
the kernel setting, to which we collectively refer to as fine-grained KASLR. With R^X en-
suring the secrecy of kernel code, fine-grained KASLR provides protection against (in)direct
ROP/JOP and alike code-reuse attacks.
In principle, kR^X may employ any leakage-resilient code diversification scheme to
defend against (in)direct (JIT-)ROP/JOP. Unfortunately, none of the previously-proposed
schemes (e.g., CPH; Readactor [48]) is geared towards the kernel setting. CPH was designed
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with support for C++, dynamic linking, and just-in-time (JIT) compilation in mind. In
contrast, commodity OSes: (a) do not support C++ in kernel mode, hence vtable and
exception handling, and COOP [170] attacks, are not relevant in this setting; (b) although
they do support loadable modules, these are dynamically linked with the running kernel
through an eager binding approach that does not involve .got, .plt, and similar con-
structs [78]; (c) have limited support for JIT code in kernel space (typically to facilitate
tracing and packet filtering [40]). These reasons prompted us to study new leakage-resilient
diversification schemes, fine-tuned for the kernel.
3.4 Design
3.4.1 R^X Enforcement
kR^X employs a self-protection approach to R^X, inspired by software fault isolation
(SFI) [116, 140, 172, 190, 199]. However, there is a fundamental difference between previ-
ous work on SFI and kR^X: SFI tries to sandbox untrusted code, while kR^X read-protects
benign code. SFI schemes (e.g., PittSFIeld [140], NaCl [172, 199]) are designed for confining
the control flow and memory write operations of the sandboxed code, typically by imposing
a canonical layout [172], bit-masking memory writes [190], and instrumenting computed
branch instructions [140]. The end goal of SFI is to limit memory corruption in a subset of
the address space, and ensure that execution does not escape the sandbox [199].
In contrast, kR^X focuses on the read operations of benign code that can be abused to
disclose memory [121]. (Memory reads are usually ignored by conventional SFI schemes,
due to the non-trivial overhead associated with their instrumentation [17, 140].) However,
the difference between our threat model and that of SFI allows us to make informed design
choices and implement a set of optimizations that result in R^X enforcement with low over-
head. We explore the full spectrum of settings and trade-offs, by presenting: (a) kR^X-SFI: a
software-only R^X scheme; (b) kR^X-MPX: a hardware-assisted R^X scheme, which exploits
the Intel Memory Protection Extensions (MPX) [102] to (almost) eliminate the protection
overhead; (c) kR^X-SEG: a hardware-based R^X scheme that leverages memory segmenta-
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.1: The Linux kernel space layout
in x86-64: (a) vanilla and (b) kR^X-KAS.
The kernel image and modules regions may
contain additional (ELF) sections; only the


















































Figure 3.2: The Linux kernel space layout
in x86 (under the default 3G/1G user/k-
ernel split): (a) vanilla and (b) kR^X-KAS.
The kernel image and modules regions may
contain extra sections.
tion (available in legacy systems) [101]; and (d) kR^X-KAS: a new kernel space layout that
facilitates the eﬀicient R^X enforcement by (a), (b), and (c).
3.4.1.1 kR^X-KAS (x86 & x86-64)
The x86-64 architecture uses 48-bit virtual addresses that are sign-extended to 64 bits
(bits [48:63] are copies of bit [47]), splitting the 64-bit virtual address space in two
halves of 128TB each. In x86-64 Linux, kernel space occupies the upper canonical half
([0xFFFF800000000000:264−1]), and is further divided into six regions (see Figure 3.1(a)) [113]:
fixmap, modules, kernel image, vmemmap space, vmalloc arena, and physmap. In x86 Linux,
kernel space can be assigned to the upper 1GB, 2GB, or 3GB part of the virtual address
space, with the first option being the default (3G/1G split). However, as address space is
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limited in 32-bit platforms, different regions collide to prevent waste (e.g., kernel image and
physmap, modules and vmalloc arena; see Figure 3.2(a)) [108].
Unfortunately, the default layout does not promote the enforcement of R^X, as it blends
together code and data regions. To facilitate a unified and eﬀicient treatment by our differ-
ent enforcement mechanisms (SFI, MPX, SEG), kR^X relies on a modified kernel layout that
maps code and data into disjoint, contiguous regions (see Figure 3.1(b); x86-64, and Fig-
ure 3.2(b); x86). The code region is carved from the top part of kernel space with its exact
size being controlled by the __START_KERNEL_map configuration option. All other regions
are left unchanged, except fixmap (and pkmap in x86), which is “pushed” towards lower
addresses, and modules, which is replaced by two newly-created areas: modules_text and
modules_data. modules_text occupies the original modules area, whereas modules_data
is placed right below fixmap. The size of both regions is configurable, with the default
value set to 512MB in x86-64, and 256MB in x86.2
3.4.1.2 Kernel Image
The kernel image is loaded in its assigned location by a staged bootstrap process. Conven-
tionally, the .text section is placed at the beginning of the image, followed by standard
(i.e., .rodata, .data, .bss, .brk) and kernel-specific sections [15]. kR^X revamps (flips)
this layout by placing .text at the end of the ELF object. Hence, during boot time, af-
ter vmlinuz is copied in memory and decompressed, .text lands at the code region of
kR^X-KAS; all other sections end up in the data region.3 The symbols _krx_edata and
_text denote the end of the data region and the beginning of the code region, in kR^X-KAS.
3.4.1.3 Kernel Modules
Although kernel modules (.ko files) are also ELF objects, their on-disk layout is left un-
altered by kR^X, as the separation of .text from all other (data) sections occurs during
load time. A kR^X-KAS-aware module loader-linker slices the .text section and copies it in
2The default setting was selected by dividing the original modules area in two equally-sized parts.
3Note that __ex_table, __tracepoints, __jump_table, and every other similar section that contains
mostly (in)direct code pointers, are placed at the code (non-readable) region and marked as non-executable.
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modules_text, while the rest of the (allocatable) sections of the ELF object are loaded in
modules_data. Once everything is copied in kernel space, relocation and symbol binding
take place (eager loading [14]).
3.4.1.4 Physmap
The physmap area is a contiguous kernel region that contains a direct (1:1) mapping of all
physical memory to facilitate dynamic kernel memory allocation [108]. Hence, as physical
memory is alloted to the kernel image and modules, the existence of physmap results in
address aliasing; virtual address aliases, or synonyms [115], occur when two (or more) dif-
ferent virtual addresses map to the same physical memory address. Consequently, kernel
code becomes accessible not only through the code region (virtual addresses above _text),
but also via physmap-resident code synonyms in the data region. To deal with this is-
sue, kR^X always unmaps any synonym pages of .text sections from physmap (as well
as synonym pages of any other section that resides in the code region), and maps them
back whenever modules are unloaded (after zapping their contents to prevent code layout
inference attacks [175]).
3.4.1.5 Alternative Layouts
kR^X-KAS has several advantages over the address space layouts imposed by SFI-based
schemes (e.g., NaCl [199], LR2 [17]). First, address space waste is kept to a minimum;
LR2 chops the address space in half to enforce a policy similar to R^X, whereas kR^X-KAS
mainly rearranges sections. More importantly, in 32-bit systems, a smaller kernel space
would necessitate the use of kmap/kunmap operations for managing page frames that cannot
be directly addressed through physmap [108],4 which, in turn, translates to higher runtime
overhead; kmap/kunmap operations require altering the kernel page table, resulting in TLB
pressure [145] and shootdowns. Second, the use of bit-masking confinement (similarly to
NaCl [199] and LR2 [17]), in the kernel setting, requires a radically different set of memory
allocators to cope with the alignment constrains of bit-masking. In contrast, the layout of
4To access the contents of a page frame, the kernel must first map that frame in kernel space. In x86,
the kernel has only 1GB – 3GB virtual addresses available for managing (up to) 64GB of RAM.
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PUSHFQ/POPFQ Elimination (O1)
cmp    $(_krx_edata-0x154), %rsi
ja     L3
cmpl   $0x7,0x154(%rsi)
 mov    0x140(%rsi),%rcx
 jg     L1
 mov    0x130(%rsi),%rax
 or     $0x400000,%rax
 mov    %rax,%rdx
 shr    $0x20,%rdx
 jmp    L2
xor    %edx,%edx







bndcu  $0x154(%rsi), %bnd0
cmpl   $0x7,0x154(%rsi)
 mov    0x140(%rsi),%rcx
 jg     L1
 mov    0x130(%rsi),%rax
 or     $0x400000,%rax
 mov    %rax,%rdx
 shr    $0x20,%rdx
 jmp    L2
xor    %edx,%edx





cmp     $(_krx_edata-0x154), %rsi
ja      L3
cmpl    $0x7,0x154(%rsi)
pushfq
cmp     $(_krx_edata-0x140), %rsi
ja      L3
popfq
 mov     0x140(%rsi),%rcx
 jg      L1
cmp     $(_krx_edata-0x130), %rsi
ja      L3
 mov     0x130(%rsi),%rax
 or      $0x400000,%rax
 mov     %rax,%rdx
 shr     $0x20,%rdx
 jmp     L2
xor     %edx,%edx
 mov     $0x1,%eax
wrmsr
 retq




lea     0x154(%rsi), %r11
cmp     $_krx_edata, %r11
ja      L3
cmpl    $0x7,0x154(%rsi)
pushfq
lea     0x140(%rsi), %r11
cmp     $_krx_edata, %r11
ja      L3
popfq
 mov     0x140(%rsi),%rcx
 jg      L1
lea     0x130(%rsi), %r11
cmp     $_krx_edata, %r11
ja      L3
 mov     0x130(%rsi),%rax
 or      $0x400000,%rax
 mov     %rax,%rdx
 shr     $0x20,%rdx
 jmp     L2
 
xor     %edx,%edx
 mov     $0x1,%eax
wrmsr
 retq





lea     0x154(%rsi), %r11
cmp     $_krx_edata, %r11
ja      L3
popfq
cmpl    $0x7,0x154(%rsi)
pushfq
lea     0x140(%rsi), %r11
cmp     $_krx_edata, %r11
ja      L3
popfq
 mov     0x140(%rsi),%rcx
 jg      L1
pushfq
lea     0x130(%rsi), %r11
cmp     $_krx_edata, %r11
ja      L3
popfq
 mov     0x130(%rsi),%rax
 or      $0x400000,%rax
 mov     %rax,%rdx
 shr     $0x20,%rdx
 jmp     L2
xor     %edx,%edx
 mov     $0x1,%eax
wrmsr
 retq




LEA Elimination (O2) CMP/JA Coalescing (O3) MPX Conversion








Figure 3.3: The different optimization phases of kR^X-SFI (a)–(d) and kR^X-MPX (e).
kR^X-KAS is transparent to the kernel’s performance-critical allocators [13]. Third, impor-
tant kernel features that are tightly coupled with the kernel address space, like KASLR [59]
or alternative user/kernel splits (e.g., 2G/2G, 1G/3G) [35], are readily supported without
requiring any kernel code change or redesign.
Finally, in x86-64, the code model (-mcmodel=kernel) used generates code for the neg-
ative 2GB of the address space [77]. This model requires the .text section of the kernel
image and modules, and their respective global data sections, to be not more than 2GB
apart. The reason is that the offset of the x86-64 %rip-relative mov instructions is only
32 bits. kR^X-KAS respects this constraint, whereas a scheme like LR2 (halved address
space) would require transitioning to -mcmodel=large, which incurs additional overhead,
as it rules out %rip-relative addressing. Interestingly, the development of kR^X-KAS helped
uncover two kernel bugs (Appendix A).
3.4.2 kR^X-SFI (x86-64)
kR^X-SFI is a software-only R^X scheme that targets modern (64-bit) platforms. Once the
kR^X-KAS layout is in place, R^X can be enforced by checking all memory reads and making
sure they fall within the data region (addresses below _krx_edata). As bit-masking load
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instructions is not an option, due to the non-canonical layout, kR^X-SFI employs range
checks (RCs) instead. The range checks are placed (at compile time) right before memory
read operations, ensuring (at runtime) that the effective addresses of reads are valid. We will
be using the example code of Figure 3.3 to present the internals of kR^X-SFI. The original
code excerpt is listed in Figure 3.3(e) (excluding the bndcu instruction at the function
prologue) and is from the nhm_uncore_msr_enable_event() routine of the x86-64 Linux
kernel (v3.19, GCC v4.7.2) [133]. It involves three memory reads: cmpl $0x7,0x154(%rsi);
mov 0x140(%rsi),%rcx; and mov 0x130(%rsi),%rax.
We begin with a basic, unoptimized (O0) range check scheme, and continue with a series
of optimizations (O1–O3) that progressively rectify the RCs for performance. Note that
similar techniques are employed by SFI systems [140, 172, 190], but earlier work focuses on
RISC-based architectures [17, 190] or fine tunes bit-masking confinement [140]. We study
the problem in a CISC (x86-64) setting, and introduce a principled approach to optimize
checks on memory reads operating on non-canonical layouts.
3.4.2.1 Basic Scheme (O0)
kR^X-SFI prepends memory read operations with a range check implemented as a sequence
of five instructions, as shown in Figure 3.3(a). First, the effective address of the memory
read is loaded by lea in the %r11 scratch register, and is subsequently checked against the
end of the data region (cmp). If the effective address falls above _krx_edata (ja), then this
is a R^X violation, as the read tries to access the code region. In this case, krx_handler()
is invoked (callq) to handle the violation; our default handler appends a warning message
to the kernel log and halts the system, but stringent policies, like active kernel exploit
response [90], can also be supported. Finally, to preserve the semantics of the original
control flow, the [lea, cmp, ja] triplet is wrapped with pushfq and popfq to maintain the
value of %rflags, which is altered by cmp.
3.4.2.2 pushfq/popfq Elimination (O1)
Spilling and filling the %rflags register is expensive [137]. However, we can eliminate
redundant pushfq-popfq pairs by performing a liveness analysis on %rflags. Figure 3.3(b)
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depicts this optimization. Every cmp instruction of a range check starts a new live region for
%rflags. If there are no kernel instructions that use %rflags inside a region, we can avoid
preserving it. For example, in Figure 3.3(b), RC1 is followed by a cmpl instruction that
starts a new live region for %rflags. Hence, the live region defined by the cmp instruction of
RC1 contains no original kernel instructions, allowing us to safely eliminate pushfq-popfq
from RC1. Similarly, the live region started by the cmp instruction of RC3 reaches only mov
0x130(%rsi),%rax, as the subsequent or instruction redefines %rflags and starts a new
live region. As mov does not use %rflags, pushfq-popfq can be removed from RC3. The
cmp instruction of RC2, however, starts a live region for %rflags that reaches jg L1—a
jump instruction that depends on %rflags—and thus pushfq-popfq are not eliminated
from RC2. This optimization can eliminate up to 94% of the original pushfq-popfq pairs
(see Section 3.6.2).5
3.4.2.3 lea Elimination (O2)
If the effective address of a read operation is computed using only a base register and a
displacement, we can further optimize our range checks by eliminating the lea instruction
and adjusting the operands of the cmp instruction accordingly. That is, we replace the
scratch register (%r11) with the base register (%reg), and modify the end of the data region
by adjusting the displacement (offset). Note that both RC schemes are computationally
equivalent. Figure 3.3(c) illustrates this optimization. In all cases lea instructions are
eliminated, and cmp is adjusted accordingly. Marked, 95% of the RCs can be optimized this
way.
3.4.2.4 cmp/ja Coalescing (O3)
Given two RCs, RCa and RCb, which confine memory reads that use the same base register
(%reg) and different displacements (offseta != offsetb), we can coalesce them to one RC
that checks against the maximum displacement, if in all control paths between RCa and
5We do not track the use of individual bits (status flags) of %rflags. As long as a kernel instruction,
inside a live region, uses any of the status bits, we preserve the value of %rflags—even if that instruction
uses a bit not related to the one(s) modified by the RC cmp (i.e., we over-preserve).
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RCb %reg is never: (a) redefined; (b) spilled to memory. Note that by recursively applying
the above in a routine, until no more RCs can be coalesced, we end up with the minimum
set of checks required to confine every memory read.
Figure 3.3(d) illustrates this optimization. All memory operations protected by the
checks RC1, RC2, and RC3 use the same base register (%rsi), but different displacements
(0x154, 0x140, 0x130). As %rsi is never spilled, filled, or redefined in any path between
RC1 and RC2, RC1 and RC3, and RC2 and RC3, we coalesce all range checks to a single RC
that uses the maximum displacement, confining all three memory reads. If %rsi + 0x154
< _krx_edata, then %rsi + 0x140 and %rsi + 0x130 are guaranteed to “point” below
_krx_edata, as long as %rsi does not change between the RC and the respective memory
reads. The reason we require %rsi not to be spilled is to prevent temporal attacks, like
those demonstrated by Conti et al. [31]. About one out of every two RCs can be eliminated
using RC coalescing.
3.4.2.5 Stack Reads
If the stack pointer (%rsp) is used with a scaled index register [101], the read is instrumented
with a range check as usual. However, if the effective address of a stack read consists only of
(%rsp) or offset(%rsp), the range check can be eliminated by spacing appropriately the
code and data regions. Recall, though, that attackers may pivot %rsp anywhere inside the
data region. By repeatedly positioning %rsp at (or close to) _krx_edata, they could take
advantage of uninstrumented stack reads and leak up to offset bytes from the code region
(assuming they control the contents at, or close to, _krx_edata for reconciling the effects of
the dislocated stack pointer). kR^X-SFI deals with this slim possibility by placing a guard
section (namely .krx_phantom), between _krx_edata and the beginning of the code region.
Its size is set to be greater than the maximum offset of all %rsp-based memory reads.
3.4.2.6 String Operations and Safe Reads
The x86 string operations [101], namely cmps, lods, movs, and scas, read memory via
the %rsi register (except scas, which uses %rdi). kR^X-SFI instruments these instructions
with RCs that check (%rsi) or (%rdi), accordingly. If the string operation is rep-prefixed,
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the RC is placed after the confined instruction, checking %rsi (or %rdi) once the respective
operation is complete.6 Lastly, absolute and %rip-relative memory reads are not instru-
mented with range checks, as their effective addresses are encoded within the instruction
itself and cannot be modified at runtime due to W^X. Safe reads account for 4% of all
memory reads.
3.4.3 kR^X-MPX (x86-64)
kR^X-MPX is a hardware-assisted, R^X scheme that takes advantage of the MPX (Memory
Protection Extensions) feature [102], available in the latest Intel CPUs, to enforce the range
checks and nearly eliminate their runtime overhead. To the best of our knowledge, kR^X is
the first system to exploit MPX for confining memory reads and implementing a memory
safety policy (R^X) within the OS.7
MPX introduces four new bounds registers (%bnd0–%bnd3), each consisting of two 64-bit
parts (lb; lower bound, ub; upper bound). kR^X-MPX uses %bnd0 to implement RCs and
initializes it as follows: lb = 0x0 and ub = _krx_edata, effectively covering everything
up to the end of the data region. Memory reads are prefixed with a RC as before (at
compile time), but the [lea, cmp, ja] triplet is now replaced with a single MPX instruction
(bndcu), which checks the effective address of the read against the upper bound of %bnd0.
Figure 3.3(e) illustrates the instrumentation performed by kR^X-MPX. Note that bndcu does
not alter %rflags, so there is no need to preserve it. Also, the checked effective address
is encoded in the MPX instruction itself, rendering the use of lea with a scratch register
unnecessary, while violations trigger a CPU exception (#BR), obviating the need to invoke
krx_handler() explicitly. In a nutshell, optimizations O1 and O2 are not relevant when
MPX is used to implement range checks, whereas O3 (RC coalescing) is used as before.
6We generate rep-prefix string instructions that operate on ascending memory addresses (%rflags.df =
0). By placing the RC immediately after the confined instruction, we can still identify reads from the code
region, albeit postmortem, without breaking code optimizations.
7Interestingly, although the Linux kernel already includes the necessary infrastructure to provide MPX
support in user programs, kernel developers are reluctant to use MPX for the kernel itself [41].
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Lastly, the user mode value of %bnd0 is spilled and filled on every mode switch; kR^X-MPX
does not interfere with the use of MPX by user applications.
3.4.4 kR^X-SEG (x86)
In legacy (32-bit) systems, kR^X-SEG enforces the R^X policy using memory segmenta-
tion [101]. Note that the use of segmentation for isolation purposes has been well researched,
both in user space [199] and kernel space [154] settings. Nevertheless, we do present the
design of a segmentation-based R^X scheme for completeness, and for demonstrating that
kR^X’s memory layout enables a unified R^X treatment by both software-based (SFI, MPX)
and hardware-only (SEG) schemes.
As x86 forbids disabling segmentation completely, Linux uses flat code and data seg-
ments that cover the whole 32-bit address space (4GB), neutralizing its effect. kR^X-SEG
redefines the kernel data segment(s) to be in par with the data region of kR^X-KAS. That
is, the base address of the segment remains 0x0, whereas its limit is set to _krx_edata
>> PAGE_SHIFT8, effectively turning every access to the code region (i.e., addresses above
_krx_edata) into a protection fault (#GP). kR^X-SEG redefines the DS, ES, and FS (per-CPU
data) segments; CS is left flat as it is not involved in data accesses, GS is only used by the
stack-smashing protector [159, 186], and limited to 4 bytes (by default), whereas SS is left
flat as well because of .krx_phantom (see “Stack Reads” in Section 3.4.2). Note that in con-
trast to kR^X-{SFI, MPX}, kR^X-SEG enforces the R^X policy without relying on (kernel)
code instrumentation.
3.4.5 Fine-grained KASLR
With kR^X-{SFI, MPX, SEG} ensuring the secrecy of kernel code under the presence of
arbitrary memory disclosure, the next step for the prevention of (JIT-)ROP/JOP is the di-
versification of the kernel code itself—if not coupled with code diversification, any execute-
only defense is useless [31, 54]. The use of code perturbation or randomization to hinder
code-reuse attacks has been studied extensively in the past [9, 57, 85, 96, 111, 119, 150, 193].
Previous research, however, either did not consider resilience to indirect JIT-ROP [31, 54],
8PAGE_SHIFT = lg(PAGE_SIZE) (i.e., 12 for 4KB pages).
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or focused on schemes geared towards userland code [17, 48]. kR^X introduces code diversi-
fication designed from the ground up to mitigate both direct and indirect (JIT-)ROP/JOP
attacks for the kernel setting.
3.4.5.1 Foundational Diversification
kR^X diversifies code through a recursive process that permutes chunks of code. The
end goal of our approach is to fabricate kernel (vmlinux) images and .ko files (modules)
with no gadgets left at predetermined locations. At the function level, we employ code
block randomization [57, 193], whereas at the section (.text) level, we perform function
permutation [9, 111].
3.4.5.2 Phantom Blocks
Slicing a function into arbitrary code blocks and randomly permuting them results (approx-
imately) in lg(B!) bits of entropy, where B is the number of code blocks [57]. However,
as the achieved randomness depends on B, routines with a few basic blocks end up having
extremely low randomization entropy. For instance, ∼12% of the Linux kernel’s (v3.19,
GCC v4.7.2) routines consist of a single basic block (i.e., zero entropy). We note that this
issue has been overlooked by previous studies [57, 193], and we augmented kR^X to resolve
it as follows.
Starting with k, the number of randomization entropy bits per function we seek to
achieve (a compile-time parameter), we first slice routines at call sites (i.e., code blocks
ending with a call instruction). If the resulting number of code blocks does not allow for
k (or more) bits of entropy, we further slice each code block according to its basic blocks.
If the achieved entropy is still not suﬀicient, we pad routines with fake code blocks, dubbed
phantom blocks, filled with a random number of int 3 instructions (stepping on them
triggers a CPU exception; #BR). Having achieved adequate slicing, kR^X randomly permutes
the final code and phantom blocks and “patches” the Control Flow Graph (CFG), so that
the original control flow remains unaltered. Any phantom blocks, despite being mixed with
regular code, are never executed due to properly-placed jmp instructions. Our approach
attains the desired randomness with the minimum number of code cuts and padding.
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3.4.5.3 Function Entry Points
Without code block permutation, an attacker that discloses a function pointer can still reuse
gadgets from the entry code block of the respective function. To prevent this, functions
always begin with a phantom block: the first instruction of each function is a jmp instruction
that transfers control to the original first code block. Hence, an attacker armed with a leaked
function pointer can only reuse a whole function, which is not a viable strategy, as function
arguments in both x86 and x86-64 Linux kernels are passed through registers [20, 142].
Consequently, as we further discuss in Section 3.6.3.3, attackers must first use gadgets to
initialize the appropriate registers before invoking a function.
3.4.5.4 Return Address Protection
Return addresses are stored in kernel stacks, which are allocated from the readable data
(physmap) region of kR^X-KAS [108]. Conti et al. demonstrated an indirect JIT-ROP attack
that relies on harvesting return addresses from stacks [31]. kR^X treats return addresses
specially to mitigate such indirect JIT-ROP attempts.
3.4.5.5 Return Address Encryption (X)
We employ an XOR-based encryption scheme to protect saved return addresses from being
disclosed [17, 157, 195]. Every routine is associated with a secret key (xkey), placed in the
non-readable region of kR^X-KAS, while function prologues and epilogues are instrumented
as follows: mov offset(%rip),%r11; xor %r11,(%rsp). That is, xkey is loaded into a
scratch register (%r11), which is subsequently used to encrypt or decrypt the saved return
address. The mov instruction that loads xkey from the code region is %rip-relative (safe
read), and hence not affected by kR^X. In x86, where %rip-relative addressing is not avail-
able, mov instructions are prefixed with the %ss selector (recall that kR^X-SEG retains a flat
4GB SS segment), and their (memory read) operand is replaced with the absolute address
corresponding to xkey; the scratch register used in x86 is %esi.
In summary, unmangled return addresses are pushed into the kernel stack by the caller
(call), encrypted by the callee, and remain encrypted until the callee returns (ret) or
performs a tail call. In the latter case, the return address is temporarily decrypted by the
CHAPTER 3. KR^X 30
push  %r11  mov   (%rsp),%rax
 mov   %r11,(%rsp)
 push  %rax
Decoy | Real Real | Decoy
(a) (b)
Figure 3.4: Instrumentation code (function prologue; x86-64) to place the decoy return
address (a) below or (b) above the real one.
function that is about to tail-jump, and re-encrypted by the new callee. Return sites are also
instrumented to zap decrypted return addresses. Note that the xkey variables are initialized
with a random value at compile time, and merged into a contiguous region at link time.
At boot time, once the kernel initializes its entropy pool(s), the respective xkey variables
of the kernel image are replenished with new random values, whereas upon loading kernel
modules, the module loader-linker places the corresponding xkey variables in the protected
region and also replenishes them with random values.
3.4.5.6 Return Address Decoys (D)
Return address decoys are an alternative scheme that leverages deception to mitigate the
disclosure of return addresses. The main benefit over return address encryption is their
slightly lower overhead in some settings, as discussed in Section 3.6.2. We begin with
the concept of phantom instructions, which is key to return address decoys. Phantom
instructions are effectively NOP instructions that contain overlapping “tripwire” (e.g., int 3)
instructions, whose execution raises an exception [47].
For instance, mov $0xcc,%r11 (mov $0xcc,%esi in x86) is a phantom instruction; apart
from changing the value of %r11 (%esi), it does not alter the CPU or memory state. The
opcodes of the instruction are the following: 49 C7 C3 CC 00 00 00 in x86-64, or BE CC
00 00 00 in x86. Note that 0xCC is also the opcode for int 3, which raises a #BR exception
when executed. kR^X pairs every return site in a routine with the tripwire of a separate
phantom instruction, randomly placed in the respective routine’s code stream. Call sites
are instrumented to pass the address of the tripwire to the callee through a predetermined
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scratch register (i.e., %r11 in x86-64, %esi in x86). Armed with that information, the callee
either: (a) places the address of the tripwire right below the saved return address on the
stack; or (b) relocates the return address so that the address of the tripwire is stored where
the return address used to be, followed by the saved return address (Figure 3.4 illustrates
the concept in x86-64). In both cases, the callee stores two addresses sequentially on the
stack. One is the real return address (R) and the other is the decoy one (D).9 The exact
ordering is decided randomly at compile time.
kR^X always slices routines at call sites. Therefore, by randomly inserting phantom
instructions in routine code, their relative placement to return sites cannot be determined
in advance (code block randomization perturbs them independently). As a result, although
return address-decoy pairs can be harvested from the kernel stack(s), the attacker cannot
differentiate which is which, because that information is encoded in each routine’s code,
which is not readable (R^X). The net result is that call-preceded gadgets [23, 55, 86] are
coupled with a pair of return addresses (R and D), thereby forcing the attacker to randomly
choose one of them. If n call-preceded gadgets are required for an indirect JIT-ROP attack,
the attacker will succeed (i.e., correctly guess the real return address in all cases) with a
probability Psucc = 1/2n.
3.5 Implementation
3.5.1 Toolchain
We implemented kR^X-{SFI, MPX, SEG} as a set of modifications to the pipeline of GCC
v4.7.2—the “de facto” C compiler for building Linux. Specifically, we instrumented the
intermediate representation (IR) used during translation to: (a) perform the RC-based
(R^X) confinement (see Section 3.4.2 and 3.4.3); and (b) randomize code blocks and protect
return addresses (Sections 3.4.5.1 and 3.4.5.4). Our prototype consists of two plugins, krx
9Stack offsets are adjusted whenever necessary: if frame pointers are used, negative %{r,e}bp offsets are
decreased by sizeof(unsigned long); if frame pointers are omitted, %{r,e}sp-based accesses to non-local
variables are increased by sizeof(unsigned long). Function epilogues, depending on the scheme employed,
make use of the real return address (i.e., by adjusting %{r,e}sp before ret and tail calls).
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and kaslr. The krx plugin is made up of 5 KLOC and kaslr of 12 KLOC (both written
in C), resulting in two position-independent (PIC) dynamic shared objects, which can be
loaded to GCC with the -fplugin directive.
We chain the instrumentation of krx after the vartrack RTL optimization pass, by
calling GCC’s register_callback() function and hooking with the pass manager [109].
The reasons for choosing to implement our instrumentation logic at the RTL level, and
not as annotations to the GENERIC or GIMPLE IR, are the following. First, by applying
our instrumentation after the important optimizations have been performed, which may
result into instructions being moved or transformed, it is guaranteed that only relevant
code will be protected. Second, any implicit memory reads that are exposed later in the
translation process are not neglected. Third, the inserted range checks are tightly coupled
with the corresponding unsafe memory reads. This way, the checks are protected from being
removed or shifted away from the respective read operations, due to subsequent optimization
passes [31].
The kaslr plugin is chained after krx, or after vartrack if krx is not loaded. Code
block slicing and permutation is the final step, after the R^X instrumentation and re-
turn address protection. By default, krx implements the kR^X-SFI scheme, operating at
the maximum optimization level (O3); kR^X-MPX can be enabled with the following knob:
-fplugin-arg-krx-mpx=1. Likewise, kaslr uses the XOR-based encryption scheme by de-
fault, and sets k (the number of entropy bits per-routine; see Section 3.4.5.4) to 30. Return
address decoys can be enabled with -fplugin-arg-kaslr-dec=1, while k may be adjusted
using -fplugin-arg-kaslr-k=N.
3.5.2 Kernel Support
kR^X-KAS (Section 3.4.1.1) and kR^X-SEG (Section 3.4.4) are implemented as a set of patches
(∼10 KLOC) for the Linux kernel (v3.19), which perform the following changes: (a) con-
struct kR^X-KAS by adjusting the kernel page tables (init_level4_pgt, swapper_pg_dir);
(b) make the module loader-linker kR^X-KAS-aware; (c) (un)map certain synonyms from
physmap during kernel bootstrap and module (un)loading; (d) replenish xkey variables
during initialization (only if XOR-based encryption is used); (e) set the limit of DS, ES,
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and FS segments to _krx_edata >> PAGE_SHIFT in gdt_page (x86 SEG only); (f) reserve
%bnd0, load it with the value of _krx_edata, and spill/fill it on mode switches (MPX only);
(g) place .text section(s) at the end of the vmlinux image and permute their functions
(vmlinux.lds.S); (h) map the kernel image in kR^X-KAS, so that executable code resides
in the non-readable region. Note that although kR^X requires patching the OS kernel,
and (re)compiling with custom GCC plugins, it does support mixed code: i.e., both pro-
tected and unprotected modules; this design not only allows for incremental deployment
and adoption, but also facilitates selective hardening [81].
3.5.3 Assembly Code
Both krx and kaslr are implemented as RTL IR optimization passes, and, therefore, cannot
handle assembly code (both “inline” or external). However, this is not a fundamental
limitation of kR^X, but rather an implementation decision. In principle, the techniques
presented in Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.5 can all be incorporated in the assembler, instead of the
compiler, as they do not depend on high-level semantics.
3.5.4 Legitimate Code Reads
Kernel tracing and debugging (sub)systems, like ftrace and KProbes [40], as well as the
module loader-linker, need access to the kernel code region. To provide support for such
frameworks, we cloned seven functions of the get_next and peek_next family of routines,
as well as memcpy, memcmp, and bitmap_copy; the cloned versions of these ten functions
are not instrumented by the krx GCC plugin—they are instrumented, however, by the
kaslr GCC plugin, and thus their callers’ return addresses are protected and their code
is randomized accordingly. Lastly, ftrace, KProbes, and the module loader-linker, were
patched to use the kR^X-based versions (i.e., the clones) of these functions (∼330 LOC),
and care was taken to ensure that none of them is leaked through function pointers or the
symbol table of the kernel.
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3.5.5 Forward Porting
Porting kR^X to newer (v4.x) kernel versions requires moderate engineering effort. More
specifically, two recent kernel features that demand special handling are: (a) BPF JIT [38]
and (b) live kernel patching [42]. To provide support for the former, the BPF JIT compiler
needs to be extended to include the techniques presented in Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.5, and
also place the emitted code in the non-readable region of kR^X-KAS. To provide support for
the latter, any routine that belongs to the patching framework, and requires reading kernel
code, needs to be treated similarly to ftrace, KProbes, etc. (see “Legitimate Code Reads”
above).
3.6 Evaluation
We studied the runtime overhead of kR^X-{SFI, MPX, SEG}, both as standalone imple-
mentations, as well as when applied in conjunction with the code randomization schemes
described in Section 3.4.5 (i.e., fine-grained KASLR coupled with return address encryp-
tion or return address decoys). We used the LMBench suite [141] for micro-benchmarking,
and employed the Phoronix Test Suite (PTS) [162] to measure the performance impact on
real-world applications. (Note that PTS is used by the Linux kernel developers to track
performance regressions.) The reported results are average values of ten and (at least) five
runs, respectively, and all benchmarks were used with their default settings. To obtain a
representative sample when measuring the effect of randomization schemes, we compiled
the kernel ten times, using an identical configuration, and averaged the results.
3.6.1 Testbed
Our experiments were carried out on a Debian GNU/Linux v7 system, equipped with a
4GHz quad-core Intel Core i7-6700K (Skylake) CPU and 16GB of RAM. The kR^X plugins
were developed for GCC v4.7.2, which was also used to build all Linux kernels (v3.19) with
the default configuration of Debian (i.e., including all modules and device drivers). Lastly,
the kR^X-protected kernels were linked and assembled using binutils v2.25.
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3.6.2 Performance
3.6.2.1 Micro-benchmarks
To assess the impact of kR^X on the various kernel subsystems and services we used LM-
Bench [141], focusing on two metrics: latency and bandwidth overhead. Specifically, we
measured the additional latency imposed on: (a) critical system calls, like open()/close(),
read()/write(), select(), fstat(), mmap()/munmap(); (b) mode switches (i.e., user
mode to kernel mode and back) using the null system call; (c) process creation (fork()+exit(),
fork()+execve(), fork()+/bin/sh); (d) signal installation (via sigaction()) and deliv-
ery; (e) protection faults and page faults; (f) pipe I/O and socket I/O (AF_UNIX and AF_INET
TCP/UDP sockets). Moreover, we measured the bandwidth degradation on pipe, socket
(AF_UNIX and AF_INET TCP), and file I/O.
Table 3.1 summarizes our results on x86-64. The columns SFI(-O0), SFI(-O1), SFI(-O2),
SFI(-O3), and MPX correspond to the overhead of RC-based (R^X) confinement. In addi-
tion, SFI(-O0)–SFI(-O3) illustrate the effect of pushfq/popfq elimination, lea elimina-
tion, and cmp/ja coalescing, when applied on an aggregate manner. The columns D and X
correspond to the overhead of return address protection (D: return address decoys, X: re-
turn address encryption) coupled with fine-grained KASLR, whereas the last four columns
(SFI+D, SFI+X, MPX+D, MPX+X) report the overhead of the full protection schemes that kR^X
provides.
The software-only kR^X-SFI scheme incurs an overhead of up to 24.82% (avg. 10.86%)
on latency and 6.43% (avg. 2.78%) on bandwidth. However, with hardware support
(kR^X-MPX) the respective overheads decrease dramatically; latency: ≤ 6.27% (avg. 1.35%),
bandwidth: ≤ 1.43% (avg. 0.34%). The overhead of fine-grained KASLR is relatively
higher; when coupled with return address decoys (D), it incurs an overhead of up to 15.03%
(avg. 6.21%) on latency and 3.71% (avg. 1.66%) on bandwidth; when coupled with re-
turn address encryption (X), it incurs an overhead of up to 18.3% (avg. 9.3%) on latency
and 4.4% (avg. 3.71%) on bandwidth. Lastly, the overheads of the full kR^X protec-
tion schemes translate (roughly) to the sum of the specific R^X enforcement mechanism
(kR^X-SFI, kR^X-MPX) and fine-grained KASLR scheme (D, X) used.
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Table 3.2 summarizes our results on x86. The column SEG corresponds to the overhead of
the R^X enforcement alone (i.e., kR^X-KAS and adjusted segment limits), whereas columns
SEG+D and SEG+X correspond to the overhead of the full protection schemes, when using
the return address decoys and return address encryption protection schemes respectively.
The enforcement of kR^X-SEG incurs an overhead of up to 10.66% (avg. 0.33%) on latency
and 2.46% (avg. 0.68%) on bandwidth. When coupled with fine-grained KASLR and the
return addresses are protected using decoys, the overhead on latency is up to 16.22% (avg.
6.63%) and on bandwidth is up to 5.95% (avg. 2.57%), whereas when the return addresses
are encrypted the overhead is slightly higher; up to 20.46% (avg. 8.98%) on latency and up
to 5.23% (avg. 3.16%) on bandwidth. Note that we did not measure the overhead of fine-
grained KASLR alone; since kR^X-SEG incurs negligible overhead, we expect performance
to be similar to SEG+D and SEG+X.
In a nutshell, the impact of kR^X on I/O bandwidth ranges from negligible to moderate.
As far as the latency is concerned, different kernel subsystems and services are affected
dissimilarly; open()/close(), read()/write(), fork()+execve(), select (100 TCP fds),
and pipe and socket I/O suffer the most.
3.6.2.2 Macro-benchmarks
To gain a better understanding of the performance implications of kR^X on realistic con-
ditions, we used PTS [162]; PTS offers a number of system tests, such as ApacheBench,
DBench, and IOzone, along with real-world workloads, like extracting and building the
Linux kernel. Note that PTS executes each test at least five times but will execute it more
times if the relative standard deviation is larger than a specific threshold (namely 3.5%).
Table 3.3 presents the overhead for each benchmark on x86-64, under the different memory
protection (SFI, MPX) and code diversification (D, X) schemes that kR^X provides. Similarly,
Table 3.4 presents the overhead of the same benchmarks on x86 (i.e., the overhead of SEG,
along with fine-grained KASLR, and both D and X schemes).
On x86-64, if the CPU lacks MPX support, the average overhead of full protection,
across all benchmarks, is 4.04% (SFI+D) and 3.63% (SFI+X), respectively. When MPX
support is available, the overhead drops to 2.32% (MPX+D) and 2.62% (MPX+X). The impact
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syscall() 0.47% 1.40% 1.33%
open()/close() ~0% 12.26% 17.36%
read()/write() 0.20% 6.29% 9.47%
select(10 fds) 0.05% 5.80% 6.44%
select(100 TCP fds) ~0% 9.89% 16.08%
fstat() 1.11% 10.66% 12.69%
mmap()/munmap() ~0% 6.25% 8.32%
fork()+exit() 0.11% 6.06% 6.33%
fork()+execve() 3.94% 12.93% 14.93%
fork()+/bin/sh ~0% 7.24% 7.07%
sigaction() 0.03% 1.02% ~0%
Signal delivery 0.12% 4.92% 9.74%
Protection fault ~0% 1.58% 4.10%
Page fault ~0% 8.91% 11.27%
Pipe I/O ~0% ~0% 1.80%
UNIX socket I/O ~0% ~0% ~0%
TCP socket I/O ~0% 16.22% 20.46%






Pipe I/O 2.46% 5.95% 5.23%
UNIX socket I/O 0.89% 2.09% 4.60%
TCP socket I/O ~0% 2.65% 3.49%
mmap() I/O 0.06% ~0% 0.04%
File I/O ~0% 2.14% 2.45%
Table 3.2: kR^X runtime overhead on the LMBench micro-benchmark (% over vanilla
Linux; x86).
of code diversification (i.e., fine-grained KASLR plus return address decoys or return ad-
dress encryption) ranges between 0%–10% (0%–4% if we exclude PostMark). The PostMark
benchmark exhibits the highest overhead, as it spends ∼83% of its time in kernel mode,
mainly executing read()/write() and open()/close(), which according to Table 3.1 in-
cur relatively high latency overheads. Lastly, it is interesting to note the interplay of
kR^X-{SFI, MPX} with fine-grained KASLR, and each of the two return address protec-
tion methods (D, X). Although in both cases there is a performance difference between the
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Benchmark Metric SFI MPX SFI+D SFI+X MPX+D MPX+X
Apache Req/s 0.54% 0.48% 0.97% 1.00% 0.81% 0.68%
PostgreSQL Trans/s 3.36% 1.06% 6.15% 6.02% 3.45% 4.74%
Kbuild sec 1.48% 0.03% 3.21% 3.50% 2.82% 3.52%
Kextract sec 0.52% ~0% ~0% ~0% ~0% ~0%
GnuPG sec 0.15% ~0% 0.15% 0.15% ~0% ~0%
OpenSSL Sign/s ~0% ~0% 0.03% ~0% 0.01% ~0%
PyBench msec ~0% ~0% ~0% 0.15% ~0% ~0%
PHPBench Score 0.06% ~0% 0.03% 0.50% 0.66% ~0%
IOzone MB/s 4.65% ~0% 8.96% 8.59% 3.25% 4.26%
DBench MB/s 0.86% ~0% 4.98% ~0% 4.28% 3.54%
PostMark Trans/s 13.51% 1.81% 19.99% 19.98% 10.09% 12.07%
Average 2.15% 0.45% 4.04% 3.63% 2.32% 2.62%
Table 3.3: kR^X runtime overhead on the Phoronix Test Suite (% over vanilla Linux;
x86-64).
two approaches, for SFI this is in favor of X (encryption), while for MPX it is in favor of D
(decoys).
In x86, the overhead of kR^X-SEG ranges from negligible to 4.62%, with an average of
0.77%, showcasing the eﬀiciency of using the segmentation unit to enforce boundaries on
memory operations (on real-world workloads). When coupled with fine-grained KASLR,
and the return addresses are protected with decoys, the overhead is increased to a maximum
of 6.13%, with an average of 1.32%, while with return address encryption the maximum
overhead is 4.85% and the average is 1.69%. Note that, similarly to MPX, the overhead of
encrypting the return addresses is (slightly) larger than employing return address decoys.
This indicates that return address decoys are better suited for schemes that utilize hardware
assistance, while return address encryption is more suitable for older CPUs that need to
use the software-only SFI scheme to protect their kernels.
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Benchmark Metric SEG SEG+D SEG+X
Apache Req/s 0.20% 0.13% 0.21%
PostgreSQL Trans/s ~0% 4.38% 5.29%
Kbuild sec 0.27% 0.97% 1.57%
Kextract sec 0.32% 1.13% 0.43%
GnuPG sec 0.15% 0.15% 0.26%
OpenSSL Sign/s 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
PyBench msec 0.14% ~0% ~0%
PHPBench Score ~0% 0.20% 0.23%
IOzone MB/s ~0% 1.41% 2.65%
DBench MB/s 2.72% 0.07% 3.10%
PostMark Trans/s 4.62% 6.13% 4.85%
Average 0.77% 1.32% 1.69%
Table 3.4: kR^X runtime overhead on the Phoronix Test Suite (% over vanilla Linux; x86).
3.6.3 Security
3.6.3.1 Direct ROP/JOP
To assess the effectiveness of kR^X against direct ROP/JOP attacks, we used the ROP
exploit for CVE-2013-2094 [206], targeting Linux v3.8. We first verified that the exploit
was successful on the appropriate kernel, and then tested it on the same kernel armed with
kR^X. The exploit failed, as the ROP payload relied on pre-computed (gadget) addresses.
We then compared the vanilla and kR^X-armed vmlinux images. First, we dumped all
functions and compared their addresses; under kR^X no function remained at its original
location (function permutation). Second, we focused on the internal layout of each function
separately, and compared them (vanilla vs. kR^X version) byte-by-byte; again, under kR^X
no gadget remained at its original location (code block permutation). Recall that the default
value (k) for the entropy of each routine is set to 30. Hence, even in the extreme scenario of
a pre-computed ROP payload that uses gadgets only from a single routine, the probability
of guessing their placement is Psucc = 1/230, which we consider to be extremely low.
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3.6.3.2 Direct JIT-ROP
As there are no publicly-available JIT-ROP exploits for the Linux kernel, we retrofitted an
arbitrary read vulnerability in the debugfs pseudo-filesystem, reachable by user mode.10
Next, we modified the previous exploit to abuse this vulnerability and disclose the locations
of the required gadgets by reading the (randomized) kernel .text section. Armed with that
information, the payload of the previously-failing exploit is adjusted accordingly. We first
tested with fine-grained KASLR enabled, and the R^X enforcement disabled, to verify that
JIT-ROP works as expected and indeed bypasses fine-grained randomization. Then, we
enabled the R^X enforcement and tried the modified exploit again; the respective attempt
failed as the code section (.text) cannot be read under R^X.
3.6.3.3 Indirect JIT-ROP
To launch an indirect JIT-ROP attack, code pointers (i.e., return addresses and function
pointers) need to be harvested from the kernel’s data region. Due to code block random-
ization, the knowledge of a return site cannot be used to infer the addresses of gadgets
relative to the return site itself (the instructions following a return site are always placed in
a permuted code block). Yet, an attacker can still leverage return sites to construct ROP
payloads with call-preceded gadgets [23, 55, 86]. In kR^X, return addresses are either
encrypted, and hence their leakage cannot convey any information regarding the placement
of return sites, or “hidden” among decoy addresses, forcing the attacker to guess between
two gadgets (i.e., the real one and the tripwire) for every call-preceded gadget used; if the
payload consists of n such gadgets the probability of succeeding is Psucc = 1/2n.
Regarding function pointers (i.e., addresses of function entry points that can be har-
vested from the stack, heap, or global data regions, including the interrupt vector table
and system call table) or leaked return addresses (Section 3.7.1), due to function permuta-
tion, their leakage does not reveal anything about the immediate surrounding area of the
disclosed routine. In addition, due to code block permutation, knowing any address of a
function (e.g., either the starting address or a return site) is not enough for disclosing the
10The vulnerability allows an attacker to set (from user mode) an unsigned long pointer to an arbitrary
address in kernel space, and read sizeof(unsigned long) bytes by dereferencing it.
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exact addresses of gadgets within the body of this function. Recall that code block per-
mutation inserts jmp instructions (for connecting the permuted basic blocks) both in the
beginning of the function (to transfer control to the original entry block) and after every
call site. As the per-routine entropy is at least 30 bits, the safest strategy for an attacker
is to reuse whole functions. However, in both x86 and x86-64 Linux kernels, function ar-
guments are passed in registers; specifically, the first 3 arguments on x86 and the first 6
arguments on x86-64 [20, 142]. This necessitates the use of gadgets for loading registers
with the proper values. In essence, kR^X effectively restricts the attacker to data-only type
of attacks on function pointers [176] (e.g., overwriting function pointers with the addresses




Both return address protections are subject to substitution attacks. To illustrate the main
idea behind them, we will be using the return address encryption scheme (return address
decoys are also susceptible to such attacks). Assume two call sites for function f, namely
CS1 and CS2, with RS1 and RS2 being the corresponding return sites. If f is invoked from
CS1, RS1 will be stored (encrypted) in a kernel stack as follows: [RS1^xkeyf]. Likewise, if
f is invoked from CS2, RS2 will be saved as [RS2^xkeyf]. Hence, if an attacker manages to
leak both “ciphertexts,” though they cannot recover RS1, RS2, or xkeyf, they may replace
[RS1^xkeyf] with [RS2^xkeyf] (or vice versa), thereby forcing f to return to RS2 when
invoked from CS1 (or to RS1 when invoked from CS2). Note that replacing [RS1^xkeyf],
or [RS2^xkeyf], with any harvested (encrypted) return address, say [RSn^xkeyf'], is not
a viable strategy because the respective return sites (RS1/RS2, RSn) are encrypted with
different keys (xkeyf, xkeyf')—under return address encryption (X), substitution attacks
are only possible among return addresses encrypted with the same xkey.
Substitution attacks resemble the techniques for overcoming coarse-grained CFI by
stitching together call-preceded gadgets [23, 55, 86]. However, in such CFI bypasses,
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any call-preceded gadget can be used as part of a code-reuse payload, whereas in a sub-
stitution attack, for every function f, the (hijacked) control flow can only be redirected
to the valid return sites of f, and, in particular, to the subset of those valid sites that
can be leaked dynamically (i.e., at runtime). Leaving aside the fact that the number of
call-preceded gadgets, at the attacker’s disposal, is highly limited in such scenarios, both
our return address protection schemes aim at thwarting JIT-ROP, and, therefore, are not
geared towards ensuring the integrity of code pointers [124].
3.7.1.2 Race Hazards
Both schemes presented in Section 3.4.5.4 obfuscate return addresses after they have been
pushed (in cleartext) in the stack. Although this approach entails changes only at the
callee side, it does leave a window open for an attacker to probe the stack and leak un-
encrypted/real return addresses [31]. Chapter 4 describes a different system (kSplitStack)
to protect return addresses that does not suffer from those limitations, based on relocating
return addresses to the protected region.
3.7.2 Handling Violations
As mentioned in Section 3.4, when kR^X detects an attempt to read the protected region,
it calls krx_handler which logs debugging information to the kernel log and halts the
system. Nonetheless, kR^X can be configured to employ custom violation handlers using
the -fplugin-arg-krx-stub knob. To facilitate user needs, the RCs implementation could
be slightly adjusted to pass different information to the handler.
In the current implementation of kR^X-SFI, we add one call to krx_handler in ev-
ery function and redirect all RCs to it. This allows the handler to log the function that
the violation occurred before halting the system. Snippet 3.1 shows how the injected in-
strumentation should be modified to facilitate users that would like to obtain the specific
address/RC which triggered the violation.
This RC changes from a “never-taken” to an “always-taken” branch, since for every
memory read that does not target the code section, the branch is taken. Note that this
instrumentation: (a) is compatible with all optimizations (O0–O3) we discussed, and (b) al-
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pushf
lea 0x154(% r s i ) ,% r11
cmp $_krx_edata ,%r11
jbe s a f e_ lb l
ca l l krx_handler
s a f e_ lb l : popf
Listing 3.1: Alternative RC instrumentation applied on a memory read
lows the kernel to continue its execution once the handler is executed (i.e., if the handler
does not halt the system). Admittedly, we employed this version of the instrumentation
during the development of kR^X and found it very useful for debugging purposes, however
it increases the memory footprint of the kR^X instrumentation and our internal measure-
ments indicate that it induces a slightly higher overhead than the “never-taken” approach
which makes it less suitable for everyday use.




Protecting code pointers is fundamental in order to prevent code reuse attacks as discussed
in Section 2. Unfortunately, many code pointer protection schemes (including the ones
presented in Section 3.4) suffer from race hazards: an adversary can leak or corrupt them
before they are protected by constantly probing the address that it resides, therefore severely
undermining the effectiveness of the deployed scheme.
In this chapter we discuss the practicality and effectiveness of such attacks and inves-
tigate whether a defense solution (kSplitStack) that does not suffer from this weakness can
eﬀiciently and effectively protect OS kernels.
4.1.1 Threat Model
Adversarial Capabilities We assume an unprivileged local attacker (i.e., with the abil-
ity to execute, or control the execution of, user programs on the OS) who seek to execute
arbitrary code with elevated privileges by exploiting kernel-memory corruption bugs. Specif-
ically, the attacker is armed with an arbitrary memory disclosure bug [204, 207] which that
may be triggered multiple times, thereby leaking any kernel memory address. Additionally,
she also controls an arbitrary memory corruption bug [165, 203, 205, 208–211] that allows
her to corrupt the contents of any kernel-space memory address. Finally, the attacker is
able to trigger hardware events (e.g., interrupts, exceptions) [101] at will, without halting
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or otherwise impeding the execution of the kernel. Microarchitectural attacks, like Melt-
down [134], Spectre [114], RIDL [188] and similar side-channel attacks [91], are considered
out of scope.
Hardening Assumptions We presume an OS that is not vulnerable to direct code in-
jection attacks by enforcing the W^X policy [125, 132, 185] in kernel space. We also as-
sume that the kernel is hardened against ret2usr attacks using either hardware (e.g., Intel
SMEP [200] and SMAP [39], ARM PXN [3] and PAN [18]) or software (e.g., KERNEXEC [156],
UDEREF [154, 155], kGuard [109], KPTI [43]) solutions. Additionally, we assume that the
kernel is hardened against function pointer tampering [168, 170] using a function pointer
protection scheme such as CFI [50, 79, 97, 129, 146, 183]. We assume sane (read-only)
memory permissions for the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) and Global Descriptor Table
(GDT) [32, 76]. We also consider a kernel that is not vulnerable to page table tamper-
ing [127] by self-protecting the page tables [52, 53]. Finally, the kernel may have support
for kernel-space ASLR [59], stack-smashing protection [186], proper .rodata sections (con-
stification of critical data structures) [185], pointer (symbol) hiding [164] or any other
kernel hardening feature —they are orthogonal to kSplitStack. Data-only attacks such as
credentials modification [198] are considered out of scope and their protection [26] is also
orthogonal to kSplitStack.
Overall, the adversarial capabilities of the attacker in kSplitStack are realistic and re-
semble the capabilities assumed by code reuse defenses that protect user space applica-
tions [5, 6, 17, 48, 49, 54, 84, 174, 187].
4.2 Effectiveness of Race Hazards
There are two main ways that architectures facilitate storing return addresses when a sub-
routine is called: employing a register or storing them to the program stack. The former
is typically preferred by RISC architectures with many registers (e.g., ARM [3], Power
ISA [105]) and even though return addresses need to be stored in memory in the case
of nested calls, it can be beneficial for leaf functions. The latter approach, on the other
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hand, is typically employed by CISC architectures with a limited number of registers (e.g.,
x86/x86-64 [104]) and delegates storing return addresses in the stack to the hardware.
Many return address protection schemes that target the x86/x86-64 architecture protect
return addresses after the hardware emits them to the stack [21, 51, 89, 157], similarly to
the return address protection schemes we present in Section 3.4. Unfortunately, this renders
them vulnerable to race conditions; an attacker could leak or corrupt a return address in the
stack before it is protected. On legacy systems, such attacks relied on multithreaded schedul-
ing in order to access the victim stack before the return address is protected. However, on
modern systems with multiple CPU cores, this problem is exacerbated since attackers can
“pin” their attack program on one core and probe vulnerable programs that execute on
different cores at real time [31].
Even though this methodology has been well known, exploiting such vulnerabilities in
a reliable fashion has been seen as extremely hard due to the narrow race windows, as
evidenced by the discussions of the authors of almost all the aforementioned vulnerable
systems. To assess the effectiveness of this methodology in the kernel setting, we perform
the following experiment: in a kR^X-protected kernel using the return address encryption
scheme we spawn a victim and an attacker process, “pinning” them to different CPU cores.
The victim process repeatedly calls the read system call, reading a large 100MB file, while
the attacker process repeatedly uses the arbitrary memory read vulnerability described in
Section 3.6.3 until it wins the race (i.e., obtains the plaintext return addresses). Note that
since kR^X, similarly to the rest of the vulnerable systems, does not change the stack layout
—e.g., by adding or removing local variables— an attacker can always know a priori the
exact offsets in the victim stack that hold the return address and as per the threat model
of kR^X an attacker could repeat this procedure for all system calls.
We ran the experiment ten times and measured the time it took the attacker process to
leak the first three return addresses pushed in the stack. On average, it took the attacker
process ∼4 milliseconds to leak all three return addresses with ∼1443 read attempts. These
results indicate that even in the (more challenging) kernel setting1, race conditions is a
1Kernel attackers need to employ the system call interface in order to exploit the arbitrary memory read
vulnerability, whereas in user space one thread can freely read the other thread stack.
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severe weakness that can completely undermine the security of defense solutions. This is
further evidenced by the decision of Microsoft to stop the deployment of Return Flow Guard
(RFG) due to a race conditions vulnerability discovered by their red team [10], as well as
past research that employed race conditions to bypass other CFI implementations [31].
4.3 Approach
The current stature of defenses against x86/x86-64 kernel code reuse attacks is vulnerable
against race conditions targeting code pointers (more specifically return addresses). In
the previous section (Section 4.2) we show that the return address protection schemes of
kR^X can be easily bypassed by exploiting the race hazards they suffer from. IskiOS [89]
incorporates a shadow stack in the Linux kernel which is isolated through Intel Memory
Protection Keys (MPK) [94]. While the use of MPK for user space memory isolation
is already shown [184], IskiOS takes advantage of the introduction of KPTI [43] to safely
employ MPK in the kernel setting. Unfortunately, similarly to kR^X, it is vulnerable against
race conditions both when copying the return address to the protected shadow stack in the
function prologue and when copying it back to the stack in the function epilogue.
Implementations of shadow stacks tailored to user space are not impeccable either. Some
state-of-the-art implementations [21, 51] suffer from the same weakness (introduction of race
conditions) and are therefore not suitable solutions for our threat model. The original CFI
paper [2], avoids race conditions by replacing the call/ret pair with indirect jmp instruc-
tions. Unfortunately this approach has been shown to impose significant overhead [51],
probably because the target prediction mechanisms of indirect jumps is not as effective as
the ones employed when returning from a function call [197].
ASLR-Guard [136] and Code Pointer Integrity [124] also introduce shadow stack imple-
mentations that do not suffer from race conditions. They reserve a general-purpose register
and employ it as the stack pointer of the unprotected stack and repurpose %rsp to point
to the shadow stack. Then they modify the compiler to emit instructions that modify the
reserved register when storing local variables or spilling registers. This scheme is not only
safe from race hazards but it also avoids the costly conversion of call/ret instructions to
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indirect jumps. Unfortunately, it is not an ideal fit for the kernel setting where a large per-
centage of the code base is low-level handwritten assembly code; every explicit %rsp-based
instruction needs to be carefully rewritten so that it uses the appropriate register (poten-
tially with a different offset since under these schemes the return address is not present
in the stack frame) while instructions that push and pop values to the stack could lead
to increased overhead since they would have to be replaced with sub/mov and mov/add
sequences respectively. More importantly, instructions that implicitly use the %rsp register
might be impossible to be rewritten in a manner that does not utilize the protected stack.
As an example, the kernel often spills/fills the value of the %rflags register when it dis-
ables interrupts (e.g., before entering a spinlock). This is achieved with the pushf/popf
instructions which implicitly employ the %rsp register. Such instances showcase that it is
infeasible to avoid storing non-sensitive values in the shadow stacks, despite the authors
intent.
To fill the gap of a race-free, kernel-tailored shadow stack we present kSplitStack: a
novel scheme that is based on relocating the stack pointer to an isolated region before any
function call —therefore keeping the return address always protected— while also forcing the
hardware to emit code pointers (e.g., control data in the interrupt context) in the protected
region thus protecting another weakness of current state-of-the-art kernel defenses.
4.4 Design
4.4.1 kSplitStack Region
User space processes and threads (from this point on we will refer collectively to both as
tasks), in addition to their user space stacks, also have their own dedicated kernel stacks.
These stacks are used by kernel code whenever a task performs a system call or whenever
the execution of a task triggers an exception (e.g., a page fault). Unfortunately, even
though return addresses are becoming a valuable target for attackers, the kernel provides
no protection against their leakage [31, 54] or corruption [12]. kSplitStack provides strong
protection against any unauthorized return address access in the kernel stack, by relocating
all return addresses to an isolated region, in an approach similar to a shadow stack. In















































Figure 4.1: The high level overview of kSplitStack.
contrast to previous user space shadow stack implementations kSplitStack is tailored to the
kernel setting, which as we will explain in the following sections poses unique challenges
which require special consideration and handling.
Every time a task is created, kSplitStack reserves additional physical page frames and
employs them as the physical memory of the task shadow stack. Whenever this process is
scheduled for execution, these page frames are mapped in the kSplitStack arena: an isolated
region on the top of the address space, protected by range checks (Figure 4.1). Carving
this region from the top of the address space facilitates its eﬀicient protection: if a parallel
shadow stack scheme was employed then kSplitStack would have to employ multiple range
checks —one for every shadow stack— which, in turn, would result to excessive performance
overhead. On the other hand, if kSplitStack carved the region in a location surrounded by
other data, it would require checking both its bounds, whereas by placing it at a completely
disjoint region on the top, kSplitStack only needs to check its lower bound.
Figure 4.1 shows the internal structure of the isolated region. The region is split into
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subregions, each used exclusively by a single CPU core. This allows kSplitStack to seam-
lessly protect kernel return addresses in modern, multicore systems where multiple tasks are
executed simultaneously on different cores. Each subregion is further divided into six slots.
The first slot corresponds to the currently executing task in the CPU, while the rest are
related to hardware event handling (we discuss event handling in detail in Section 4.4.3).
Every time a task is scheduled for execution, kSplitStack first identifies the core it will be
executed and maps the reserved page frames of this task in the appropriate slot. It also
invalidates the stale TLB entries of this slot, thus ensuring that each task can only access its
own shadow stack. Note that kSplitStack supports the same number of CPUs as the kernel,
since the size of the isolated region is determined by the CONFIG_NR_CPUS configuration
option. To avoid physical memory waste when the actual number of CPUs in a system is
smaller than the one specified by the option, the physical page frames that belong to the
unused portion of the region are freed after boot.
Finally, even though the shadow stacks in the isolated region are protected against any
unauthorized access, attackers might try to take advantage of the directly mapped memory
(physmap). The physmap is a region in the kernel portion of the address space that maps
all physical page frames to facilitate eﬀicient dynamic memory allocation [108]. Without
special consideration, the page frames used as shadow stacks would also be mapped in the
(unprotected) physmap, where they could leaked or modified. kSplitStack meticulously
unmaps the shadow stack page frames from the physmap whenever a task is created and
zaps their contents before remapping them on task exit; therefore preventing attackers from
accessing their aliases.
4.4.2 Relocating Return Addresses
Once the shadow stack page frames are mapped, kernel code can start using it to safely store
return addresses. Unfortunately, code uses the stack to also store local variables thus simply
redirecting the stack pointer to the shadow stack is not a viable option. Instead, kSplitStack
injects lightweight instrumentation to ensure that only return addresses are emitted to the
isolated region while local variables remain in the (unprotected) kernel stack. To achieve
this, kSplitStack forces only call and ret instructions to use the shadow stack, while every
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Figure 4.2: kSplitStack instrumentation: (a) assembly code and (b) compiled code
other stack-based operation uses the kernel stack. Alas, both instructions are hardwired
to implicitly employ the stack pointer (%rsp, Section 4.3) in their operations which, in
turn, necessitates toggling the stack pointer value. Specifically, kSplitStack first reserves
a general purpose register (in our prototype we reserved %r142) which acts as the shadow
stack pointer. It then uses the xchg %r14,%rsp3 instruction to toggle the value of %rsp
between the kernel stack and the shadow stack.
Due to the low-level nature of its operations, the kernel consists of both assembly code
and compiled (C) code. kSplitStack meticulously instruments the functions in both sets of
code to ensure that all return addresses are safely stored in the shadow stack, however the
injected instrumentation differs. Specifically, in compiled code kSplitStack takes advantage
of the intraprocedural (CFG) produced by the compiler to minimize the number of emitted
instructions and optimize their placement, while it takes a more conservative approach in
assembly code since its CFG is not available. We will be using the example function in
2We selected %r14 because it is the callee-saved register used the least by handwritten assembly code.
3In x86-64, the xchg instruction swaps the values of its operands.
CHAPTER 4. KSPLITSTACK 53
Figure 4.2 to describe the two flavors of kSplitStack instrumentation on the same function.
Note that in assembly code the CFG is not available to kSplitStack, however we employ the
same depiction for both instrumentations for graphical consistency.
Figure 4.2(a) illustrates the emitted instrumentation on assembly code. Every function
call emits its return address to the isolated region, therefore the %rsp at the function entry
always points to the shadow stack. kSplitStack emits an xchg instruction to toggle its value
in order to allow the rest of the function body to use the kernel stack for its local variables.
It then “emulates” pushing a return address in the kernel stack by subtracting eight bytes
from %rsp. This is necessary because in the (unlikely) case that the function takes more
than six arguments, additional arguments are passed through the stack [142]. Since these
arguments are placed in the caller stack frame, the instructions that access them contain
offsets computed with the assumption that the return address is pushed in the kernel stack.
As a result, by “emulating” this operation kSplitStack ensures that these offsets are correct.
kSplitStack then identifies all call instructions in the function code stream and sur-
rounds them with xchg instructions. The xchg that precedes the call ensures that the
emitted return address is placed in the shadow stack, while the one that succeeds it switches
it back to the kernel stack to facilitate the correct use of local variables in subsequent instruc-
tions (e.g., as in the case of BB3). Finally, in the function epilogue kSplitStack “emulates”
poping the return address from the kernel stack by adding eight bytes to %rsp before tog-
gling its value to the shadow stack to facilitate the use of the real return address by the ret
instruction.
Figure 4.2(b) shows the instrumentation of kSplitStack on compiled code, where access
to the CFG is available. The first step is to eliminate the need for the sub/add pair of the
assembly instrumentation. kSplitStack achieves this by tracking all stack operations and
maintaining the depth of the stack at any given instruction. Then it examines every stack-
based access and compares its offset with the computed depth; if it is larger, it denotes an
attempt to access an argument from the stack and kSplitStack adjusts its offset.
Regarding the toggling of the %rsp value, kSplitStack follows a four step approach aimed
at optimizing both their placement and number:
1. In this bookkeeping step, kSplitStack examines the instructions of each basic block
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looking for stack-based operations. If the first stack-based operation in a basic block
uses the shadow stack (e.g., a call instruction), then kSplitStack sets the entry state
of this basic block as shadow stack. On the other hand, if the first stack-based
operation uses the kernel stack, then kSplitStack sets the basic block entry state
as stack. Similarly, depending on the last stack-based operation of the basic block,
kSplitStack determines its exit state.
2. kSplitStack scans each basic block instruction and toggles the value of %rsp whenever
there are instructions within the basic block that use different stacks. In Figure 4.2(b),
the xchg instruction in BB3 would be injected at this step, since kSplitStack would
identify that the addq instruction references a local variable in the kernel stack after
the call instruction which uses the shadow stack. Similarly in BB5 the ret uses the
shadow stack while the previous stack-based operations use the kernel stack.
3. kSplitStack compares the entry state of each basic block with the exit state of its
predecessors. If the exit state of all the predecessors is different than the entry state
of the basic block, then it emits an xchg instruction in the beginning of the basic
block. The xchg instruction in BB1 is emitted at this stage, since the exit state of
both predecessors (BB0 and BB3) is stack while the entry state of BB1 is shadow
stack. Additionally, since the entry state of BB0 is stack and the exit state of the
(dummy) entry basic block is shadow stack, kSplitStack emits the xchg instruction in
the beginning of BB0.
4. For every remaining basic block, kSplitStack examines the exit state of its predecessors
and if different than the basic block entry state it adds xchg instructions on the edges
that connect them. This facilitates supporting basic blocks with predecessors that
have mixed exit states without unnecessarily toggling the value of %rsp. The xchg
instruction on the edges that connects BB0 with BB2 is emitted at this step, as well
as on the edge that connects BB4 with BB5.
In the example of Figure 4.2, the compiled code flavor of the instrumentation halved
the number of emitted xchg instructions (six from twelve) compared to the assembly code
flavor, while also completely eliminating the instrumentation in the BB2-BB4 loop. In
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our testbed (Section 4.6), this flavor results in a 31% reduction of the emitted toggling
instructions.
The proposed instrumentation scheme offers a number of significant benefits to kSplit-
Stack. Firstly, keeping the shadow stack pointer to a reserved register simplifies its protec-
tion, since no instruction can overwrite it and it is never spilled to unprotected memory.
Additionally, toggling the value of %rsp alleviates the need to explicitly update its value,
since it is modified automatically by the call and ret instructions. Most importantly, it
facilitates race-free protection of return addresses, since return addresses are always placed
in the isolated region and are never exposed in unprotected memory.
4.4.3 Handling Hardware Events
One of the most important aspects of kernel software is dealing with synchronous and
asynchronous hardware events. Synchronous events (or exceptions) are triggered when —
user space or kernel— code performs some operation that the CPU is unable to handle. For
instance, accessing a memory address that is not mapped in the page tables will result in a
page fault. Asynchronous events (or interrupts) on the other hand are triggered at random
times, as a response to hardware signals (e.g., by incoming network traﬀic). Whenever an
event of either category occurs, the control flow is paused, the processor state at the time
of the event is stored —including the value of of the instruction pointer (%rip) at the time
of the event— and special kernel code is executed to handle it. Once the event is handled,
the stored value of %rip is used as a kernel return address to facilitate resuming the paused
control flow. In this section we discuss in detail the challenges of protecting this special
type of return address and how kSplitStack protects it in a secure and practical manner.
Figure 4.3 shows the processor state stored when handling an event on a vanilla x86-64
Linux kernel. The top five entries are automatically pushed in the stack by the hardware
when the event is triggered, while the rest are spilled by low-level assembly code. The
kernel takes advantage of the ABI [142] and avoids spilling the callee-saved registers unless
necessary (i.e., the handler of this event might need to access them), since their value will
remain unmodified throughout the execution of compiled code.










































Figure 4.3: The processor state stored when an event handler is executing.
This information is spilled in the stack that the event handler uses during its execution.
Most exceptions are handled in the same stack as the one employed by the code that
triggered the event, however interrupts and exceptions triggered in serious (potentially
unrecoverable) situations migrate to different stacks to ensure that they are handled in
known-good memory locations. Specifically, the events that migrate to a different stack
are Interrupt Requests (IRQ), Non-Maskable Interrupts (NMI), Doublefault Exceptions,
Machine Check Exceptions (MCE) and Debugging Exceptions.
In x86-64 systems, most events that require stack migration employ a hardware feature
called Interrupt Stack Table (IST). IST is a single-dimensional (per-cpu) table which can
be filled by the kernel with entries that point to the top of a stack. When the kernel
registers the handler of events it also specifies the entry of the IST that should be utilized.
If no such entry is specified, then the handler is executed without migrating to a different
stack. Note that if an entry is specified, the IST first migrates to the appropriate stack
and then allows the hardware to emit the first five entries of the processor state. The only
type of event that does not utilize the IST to migrate to a different stack is IRQ, which
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instead performs the migration through the software. This happens to facilitate handling
nested interrupts, where additional interrupts are triggered before the handler has finished
its processing. Should the IST be used, the new processor state would be emitted at the
same location (the top of the stack) effectively overwriting the previous one.
Similarly to the shadow stack instrumentation, kSplitStack protects this type of return
addresses by ensuring that they are never exposed to unprotected memory. The main
intuition behind the protection of kSplitStack lies on forcing the hardware to always spill the
processor state in the protected region by taking advantage of the IST. As mentioned above,
the IST ensures that the portion of the processor state that is emitted by the hardware is
spilled after the stack migration. kSplitStack utilizes this observation to redirect it to the
protected region and modifies the low-level code in the event handlers to also spill the
register values there, thus retaining the processor state always secure.
kSplitStack first statically allocates in the protected region enough memory to hold the
corresponding shadow stacks of the additional stacks for every CPU and unmaps their aliases
from the physmap. It then modifies the IST entries to point to the top of the shadow stack
slots rather than the top of the stacks for every event that migrates to a different stack. To
reduce its memory footprint, kSplitStack coalesces the two shadow stacks of the exceptions
(Doublefault and MCE) since these serious events typically trap the kernel and therefore
their handlers are not contentious. Note that since these shadow stack slots correspond to
the per-cpu additional stacks, they do not require updates on context switching; they are
always mapped to the same page frames throughout the system execution.
Protecting the processor state in events that originally do not migrate to a different
stack requires a slightly different approach. kSplitStack adds one more slot to each CPU
representation in the protected region, the temporary slot, adds it to an IST entry and
forces all (originally non-migrating) events to use it. kSplitStack then amends the low-level
entry point of these event handlers to copy the hardware emitted processor state to the
appropriate shadow stack location —either the kernel shadow stack or the IRQ shadow
stack in the case of an IRQ— thus always retaining them in the protected region. Once
copied, the registers are then spilled in the shadow stack therefore completing the processor
state.
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The last challenge kSplitStack has to address is allowing legitimate accesses to the
processor state by event handlers. Some event handlers require accessing the state during
their execution (e.g., if a page fault occurs in kernel memory, the handler examines the value
of %rip to determine the handling of the event), however this is not allowed since it is now
placed in the protected region. To facilitate this process, kSplitStack adds an additional
compiler pass which detects all processor state pointers and replaces their dereferences
with calls to special getter and setter functions, depending on whether the dereference is
a memory read or write. These functions are exempt from the instrumentation and are
therefore able to access the processor state. Note that kSplitStack does not assign them to
any function pointers, thus they cannot be leaked to attackers.
4.5 Implementation
4.5.1 Isolation Enforcement
There are multiple ways to preserve the integrity and secrecy of the kSplitStack region, as
discussed in Section 2. In our prototype implementation we adopted the enforcement mech-
anism of kR^X. However, since the kR^X mechanism only enforces the secrecy primitive on
its protected region, we augmented it to also instrument memory writes; thus completely
isolating the region4.
4.5.2 Kernel Modifications
For our prototype we utilized the kernel patches provided by kR^X, which perform all
the necessary kernel modifications to create an isolated region on the top of the address
space. We modified these kernel patches to: (a) statically allocate enough virtual memory
for the kSplitStack region, which is placed adjacently to the kR^X protected region (kernel
image and modules .text sections), b map the appropriate physical page frames in the
corresponding kSplitStack page table entries and flush stale TLB entries, (c) modify the
4We carefully engulfed our memory write instrumentation in the kR^X code so that optimizations would
be applied on an access level instead of treating reads and writes separately, thereby obtaining maximal
performance benefits (Section 4.6).
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IST and all hardware event handlers to employ the corresponding stacks in the protected
region, and (d) rewrite any handwritten assembly functions to avoid using %r14.
4.5.3 kSplitStack Instrumentation
Similarly to the isolation enforcement instrumentation, kSplitStack hooks additional passes
to the pass manager at the intermediate representation (IR) level to inject its instrumen-
tation. Specifically, our prototype inserts two passes: one that injects the return address
relocation instrumentation and another that substitutes dereferences of control state point-
ers with calls to accessor function (see Section 4.4). We added the former at the latest stage
of the RTL optimization phase to ensure its precise placement: both for correctness and for
security reasons it is imperative that the inserted xchg instructions remain in the intended
basic blocks and not moved to different ones. By adding the pass late in the compilation
process, kSplitStack ensures that this condition is met. The latter pass is added early in the
GIMPLE IR optimization phase for two reasons: (a) kSplitStack needs type information in
order to detect such dereferences which are available in the early compilation stages but
not in subsequent ones, and (b) by replacing the dereferences with calls as early as possi-
ble, we allow subsequent compiler optimization passes to optimize the produced binary and
therefore reap performance benefits.
Since handwritten assembly code is not processed by the compiler, their return addresses
would be exposed corruption and disclosure attempts by adversaries. To prevent this issue,
kSplitStack extends its instrumentation to also relocate return addresses of assembly code.
To instrument this code with the (unoptimized) return address relocation scheme, we added
assembler wrappers which detect patterns that denote the prologue and epilogue of functions
as well as any call instructions and instrument them accordingly.
4.5.4 Code Diversification
kSplitStack relies on code diversification to thwart direct code reuse attacks. kR^X its
isolation mechanism with a fine-grained KASLR component which randomized the kernel
code layout in order to probabilistically break such exploits (Section 3.4. However, because
kR^X did not provide comprehensive protection of return addresses (especially in the case of
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return address decoys), it employed both inter- and intra-function diversification (function
and code block permutation respectively).
kSplitStack provides significantly stronger return address protection thus intra-function
diversification is not necessary. As a result, we couple kSplitStack with a different com-
ponent based on Code Pointer Hiding (CPH) [48]. Specifically, we created a forward-edge
“trampoline” for every function and replaced all function pointers with the appropriate
“trampoline”. This is a two step process: first an assembler wrapper creates the tram-
polines of exported functions and then the relocation information of the kernel binary
(vmlinux) and the kernel modules are modified to ensure that all function pointers uti-
lize the appropriate function pointers. In contrast to the original CPH, we did not create
backward-edge trampolines or replaced the target of direct function calls with trampolines,
since kSplitStack precludes return address leaks or corruptions. Finally, all functions and
“trampolines” are permuted to ensure that their placement is randomized (inter-function
diversification).
To assess the benefits of this approach, we also coupled kSplitStack with a fine-grained
KASLR component, similar to the one of kR^X. This component does not protect return ad-
dresses but performs the rest of the diversifications (function and code block permutation).
We compare the performance of the two schemes in the following section.
4.6 Evaluation
In this section we assess the performance impact of our kSplitStack implementation on
the Linux kernel. To this end, we employ the LMBench suite [141] to perform micro-
benchmarks on various operations and services of the operating system. Additionally, we
employ the Phoronix Test Suite (PTS) [162] to measure the imposed overhead on real-
world applications. The reported results are averages of ten and five runs respectively.
Measurements that involve code randomization (i.e., fine-grained KASLR or CPH) are
the average of ten distinct measurements, each after a kernel recompilation. We focus on
measuring the performance impact of kSplitStack on CPUs that support MPX. Additional
measurements and discussion for CPUs that lack MPX support can be found in Appendix B.
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4.6.1 Testbed
Our experiments were performed on a Debian GNU/Linux v7 system, with a 4GHz quad-
core Intel Core i7-6700K (Skylake) CPU and 16GB of RAM. In all experiments the kernel
(v3.19) was built with GCC v4.7.2 (which was also used to build the GCC plugins), with the




For our first set of experiments we employed the LMBench [141] suite. LMBench measures
the latency and bandwidth of various system calls and kernel operations in order to assess
the performance of kSplitStack, therefore providing valuable fine-grained insight on its
impact to specific kernel subsystems. Specifically, we focus on the latency of user to kernel
and kernel to user context switch (syscall()) and of multiple commonly used system
calls (open()/close(), read()/write(), select(), fstat(), mmap()/munmap()). In
addition, we measured the latency of creating a process (fork()+{exit(), execve(),
/bin/sh}), installing a signal handler (sigaction()) and delivery of a signal, handling
page and protection faults, along with interacting with pipes and sockets (both UNIX and
TCP/UDP). Finally, we also measured the impact on the bandwidth of pipe, socket and
file I/O operations.
Table 4.1 summarizes our results. The second column (W) corresponds to the overhead
of instrumenting with MPX range checks only memory write operations, the third (RW) both
memory read and memory write operations, the fourth (SS) the overhead of employing a
shadow stack (i.e., reserving the region on the top of the address space, performing all
necessary page table modifications on context switch, relocating all return addresses to the
region using the instrumentation described in Section 4.4) without isolating the kSplitStack
region. The fifth (RW+SS) is the combination of RW and SS, therefore it illustrates the
overhead of safely protecting the return addresses of a non-randomized kernel. Finally,
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the last two columns combine RW+SS with code diversification schemes; RW+SS+CPH with
CPH [48] and RW+SS+KASLR with fine-grained KASLR (Section 3.4).
Instrumenting memory writes imposes a maximum overhead of 17.50% (avg. 3.04%) on
latency and 4.23% (avg. 1.32%) on bandwidth. Interestingly, instrumenting both memory
read and memory write instructions lowers the overhead, with a maximum of 7.80% (avg.
2.75) on latency and a maximum of 4.08% (avg. 1.30%) on bandwidth. We attribute that
to the check optimization of kR^X (Section 3.4: by “combining” both read and write range
checks when eliminating checks, this optimization becomes more effective and therefore
reduces the overall overhead. On the other hand, SS imposes up to 20.99% (avg. 8.12%)
on latency and up to 4.59% (avg. 2.53%) on bandwidth which when the kSplitStack region
is isolated increases to a maximum of 22.51% (avg. 11.34%) on latency and a maximum
of 7.13% (avg. 4.23%). Finally, when the kernel code layout is diversified using CPH,
the maximum overhead is 20.83% (avg. 11.42%) on latency and 3.99% (avg. 2.72%) on
bandwidth, while when fine-grained KASLR is employed, with a maximum of 27.39% (avg.
13.82%) on latency and 5.78% (avg. 3.45%) on bandwidth.
These results indicate that the overall impact of kSplitStack on latency ranges from small
to moderate with open()/close(), fork()+exit(), fork()+/bin/sh and UNIX socket
I/O suffering the most, while the impact on bandwidth ranges from negligible to small.
Additionally, they show that the impact of both randomization schemes is limited with
CPH being more eﬀicient since it only affects indirect function calls, in contrast to fine-
grained KASLR that blindly diversifies all functions.
4.6.2.2 Macro-Benchmarks
To obtain an understanding of the performance of a kSplitStack-protected system, we em-
ploy PTS [162], a suite that offers a plethora of benchmarks and common workload tests
of popular real-world applications. From these, we selected a set of tests that stress differ-
ent types of operations such as serving HTTP requests (Apache), performing transactions
on a database (PostgreSQL), building and extracting a kernel (Kbuild and Kextracting),
encrypting and signing files (GnuPG and OpenSSL) along with benchmarks that measure
the performance of interpreters (PyBench and PHPBench), file system and disk (IOZone
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syscall() ~0% 0.43% 3.55% 4.59% 5.32% 5.52%
open()/close() 1.77% 4.71% 9.29% 19.25% 16.32% 22.45%
read()/write() ~0% 0.31% 6.71% 9.83% 9.78% 11.47%
select(10 fds) 0.57% 1.15% 8.92% 9.73% 10.38% 13.71%
select(100 TCP fds) 8.38% 3.94% 0.48% 5.76% 6.26% 7.21%
fstat() ~0% 0.90% 7.87% 12.38% 11.85% 14.87%
mmap()/munmap() 1.43% 3.48% 5.57% 9.32% 7.68% 9.51%
fork()+exit() 11.47% 7.26% 9.87% 15.26% 15.89% 14.41%
fork()+execve() ~0% ~0% 6.73% 11.25% 18.37% 23.82%
fork()+/bin/sh 17.50% 0.63% 20.99% 22.51% 20.83% 27.39%
sigaction() ~0% ~0% 7.24% 8.08% 7.92% 8.47%
Signal delivery 0.20% 1.27% 13.19% 14.27% 15.72% 17.15%
Protection fault ~0% 0.73% ~0% 4.63% 1.45% 2.93%
Page fault 6.40% 7.80% 8.32% 7.78% 13.07% 15.28%
Pipe I/O ~0% 2.02% 10.47% 12.75% 10.21% 9.81%
UNIX socket I/O 6.95% 6.33% 16.82% 20.37% 18.18% 17.79%
TCP socket I/O ~0% 3.51% ~0% 3.45% 2.08% 9.14%






Pipe I/O (bandwidth) 0.25% 1.72% 4.08% 3.81% 3.99% 4.75%
UNIX socket I/O (bandwidth) 0.72% 0.68% 1.22% 2.89% 2.64% 3.06%
TCP socket I/O (bandwidth) 1.40% ~0% 4.59% 3.12% 3.79% 5.78%
mmap() I/O (bandwidth) 4.23% 4.08% ~0% 4.18% ~0% ~0%
File I/O (bandwidth) ~0% ~0% 2.74% 7.13% 3.17% 3.66%
Table 4.1: kSplitStack runtime overhead on the LMBench micro-benchmark (% over vanilla
Linux; MPX support).
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Benchmark Metric W RW SS RW+SS RW+SS+CPH RW+SS+KASLR
Apache Req/s 2.81% 1.26% 2.81% 1.62% 1.94% 1.39%
PostgreSQL Trans/s 1.30% 3.01% ~ 0% 2.52% 2.41% 1.20%
Kbuild sec ~ 0% 0.81% 1.02% 2.36% 1.69% 2.38%
Kextract sec 0.39% ~ 0% 0.52% 0.26% 0.56% 0.52%
GnuPG sec ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% 0.10%
OpenSSL Sign/s ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0%
PyBench msec ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% 0.05% 0.01%
PHPBench Score ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0%
IOZone MB/s 1.74% 3.06% 3.97% 11.32% 8.22% 10.13%
DBench MB/s 3.49% 2.14% 2.17% 1.18% ~ 0% ~ 0%
PostMark Trans/s ~ 0% 1.82% 11.11% 12.07% 12.60% 16.18%
Average 0.88% 1.10% 1.96% 2.85% 2.50% 2.90%
Table 4.2: kSplitStack runtime overhead on the Phoronix Test Suite (% over vanilla Linux;
MPX support).
and DBench), and a simulation of an email server which manipulates multiple small files
(PostMark).
Table 4.2 shows our results. Instrumenting only memory write instructions imposes an
average overhead of 0.88% (W) which increases to 1.10% when memory read instructions
are also instrumented (RW). The overhead of employing a shadow stack without isolating
the kSplitStack region is 1.96% (SS) while when the region is isolated the overhead raises
to 2.85% (RW+SS). Finally, employing CPH to diversify the code slightly lowers the average
overhead to 2.50% (RW+SS+CPH) while employing KASLR does not add a significant impact
with a minor increase to 2.90% (RW+SS+KASLR).
Overall, the overhead of kSplitStack on real-world applications is small and comparable
to the overhead of kR^X. Note that PostMark exhibits significantly larger overhead than
the rest of the tests. This is expected: kSplitStack employs the instrumentation of kR^X,
which is known to perform worse on PostMark than the rest of the tests (Section 3.6.2).
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4.6.3 Security Evaluation
In this section we discuss the effectiveness of kSplitStack against any flavor of (kernel)
code reuse attacks. Note that for this security discussion we use the complete version of
kSplitStack, i.e., RW+SS+CPH.
Direct Code Reuse and Direct JIT Code Reuse kSplitStack relies on the method-
ology of kR^X to prevent these types of attacks, therefore we employed the same set of
experiments as in Section 3.6.3 to assess its effectiveness. In a kSplitStack-protected kernel,
direct code reuse exploits would fail due to the fine-grained code diversification (function
permutation) employed. In our experiment, the exploit failed and we verified that the ad-
dresses of all the gadgets that it employed were relocated (the functions that they belonged
were in a different order). Additionally, kSplitStack prevents direct JIT code reuse attacks
by rendering the kernel code unreadable, thus our exploit attempt failed at the code leak
stage.
Indirect JIT Code Reuse To perform an indirect JIT code reuse attack, an adversary
needs to leak code pointers in order to construct the exploit. In the kernel setting, there
are three types of code pointers an adversary could employ: return addresses, code pointers
emitted during hardware events, and function pointers. kSplitStack stores return addresses
in its protected region in a race-free manner, therefore completely mitigating the threat
of leaking such code pointers. Additionally, because the return addresses always remain
in the protected region which is also not writable, they cannot be corrupted as part of a
substitution attack (Section 3.7.1). Similarly, it safely protects code pointers emitted in
interrupt context by forcing the hardware through the IST to emit them in the protected
region instead of the unprotected kernel stack.
In contrast to kR^X, kSplitStack does not diversify the internal layout of functions thus
all gadgets remain in the same offset within the function body. As a result protecting
the function start address is of paramount importance. Fortunately, kSplitStack employs
CPH which mitigates this issue since any leaked function pointer holds the address of the
“trampoline”, thus impeding attackers from finding the real location of the function. Note
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that since the “trampolines” are part of the code section they are not readable, thus an
attacker cannot employ her arbitrary memory read to leak their body. Finally, in x86(-64)
the target of direct function calls is relative to the address of the call instruction, hence
it is not possible to be predicted in order to use the —unaligned— opcodes of the call
instruction as gadgets [173].
4.7 Discussion
4.7.1 Comparison with CFI
4.7.1.1 Security Analysis
In this section we discuss the difference between kSplitStack (specifically RW+SS+CPH) when
coupled with a fine-grained CFI solution and a CFI scheme similar to the one proposed in
the seminal CFI paper by Abadi et al. [2]. This scheme relies on fine-grained CFI for the
protection of the forward edges (function calls) and a shadow stack to protect backwards
edges (return addresses). For the purpose of a fair comparison, we will also assume that code
pointers emitted by hardware events are also safely stored in the shadow stack, similarly to
how kSplitStack protects them. These two schemes seem initially similar in terms of their
protection —they both utilize an shadow stack to protect backward edges and code pointers
emited during hardware events, while CFI protects forward edges. They do, however, have
a significant difference: the code of a kSplitStack-protected kernel is diversified and not
readable, whereas CFI imposes no such restriction to the attacker.
Under both schemes it is not possible to reliably redirect the control flow to a gadget
in the middle of a function. Additionally, under kSplitStack identifying the location of
gadgets inside the body of functions is not a viable option. Attackers therefore have to
revert to traditional whole function reuse typically employed in return-to-libc [58] exploits.
This methodology relies on corrupting the arguments that are passed during function calls,
however in x86-64 the first six arguments are passed through registers [142] an architectural
characteristic that severely limits the flexibility of this approach.









select(10 fds) 9.27% 10.90%







Signal delivery 13.26% 15.16%
Protection fault 0.36% 2.19%
Page fault 82.36% 66.27%
Pipe I/O 9.29% 11.59%
UNIX socket I/O 12.21% 16.80%
TCP socket I/O 4.93% 4.59%






Pipe I/O (bandwidth) 2.21% 4.01%
UNIX socket I/O (bandwidth) 2.64% 3.24%
TCP socket I/O (bandwidth) 3.05% 4.55%
mmap() I/O (bandwidth) 4.16% 2.96%
File I/O (bandwidth) 25.59% 19.90%
Table 4.3: Comparison of kSplitStack and CFI runtime overhead on the LMBench micro-
benchmark (% over vanilla Linux; MPX support).
The above force an attacker to attempt overwriting function pointers —since they are not
placed in the protected region— as part of a Call Oriented Programming (COP) [23] exploit.
While a feasible approach under both schemes, the fine-grained CFI component of both
schemes would force the attacker to construct their exploit by overwriting function pointers
with targets of the same signature, limiting their options. Due to the code diversification
and unreadable code under kSplitStack however, the attacker options are further limited;
the set of addresses that an attacker can use as targets when overwriting function pointers is
limited to the (exposed) address-taken function “trampolines”. On kernel v3.19 the address-
taken functions amount for only ~26% of the total number of functions that the attacker
could utilize under the original CFI scheme.
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Benchmark Metric CFI RW+SS+CPH+CFI
Apache Req/s 2.39% 2.06%
PostgreSQL Trans/s ~ 0% 1.48%
Kbuild sec 1.52% 1.83%
Kextract sec ~ 0% 0.27%
GnuPG sec 0.16% 0.10%
OpenSSL Sign/s ~ 0% ~ 0%
PyBench msec ~ 0% 0.05%
PHPBench Score ~ 0% ~ 0%
IOZone MB/s 8.92% 11.10%
DBench MB/s ~ 0% ~ 0%
PostMark Trans/s 11.11% 13.27%
Average 2.19% 2.74%
Table 4.4: Comparison of kSplitStack and CFI runtime overhead on the Phoronix Test Suite
(% over vanilla (% over vanilla Linux; MPX support).
4.7.1.2 Performance Analysis
To reduce the number of victim functions that an attacker can use in their exploit kSplit-
Stack needs to instrument memory read instructions and diversify the code layout. There-
fore, to further explore this comparison, we implemented both schemes and measured their
overhead using the same set of experiments as the one we employed to assess the perfor-
mance impact of kSplitStack (Section 4.6). Specifically, we coupled kSplitStack with the
forward-edge protection of kCFI [146]. Similarly, we implemented a scheme similar to the
one of Abadi et al. [2] by coupling the shadow stack of kSplitStack (but only protecting it
from corruption attempts, thus instrumenting only memory writes) with kCFI.
Table 4.3 shows the results of LMBench for both schemes. CFI represents the overhead
of the original CFI scheme, while RW+SS+CPH+CFI represents the overhead of kSplitStack
when coupled with fine-grained CFI. CFI has an average overhead of 13.79% on latency
while RW+SS+CPH+CFI has an average latency overhead of 14.91%. In both schemes the
tests that suffer the most are fork()+exit(), fork()+execve() and fork()+/bin/sh
and have a clear outlier on the page fault handler benchmark which amounts as the largest
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overhead on both (82.36% on CFI, 66.27% on RW+SS+CPH+CFI). Regarding bandwidth, CFI
has an average overhead of 7.52% while RW+SS+CPH+CFI has an average overhead of 6.93%.
In both schemes the test that is affected the most is File I/O (25.59% on CFI, 19.90% on
RW+SS+CPH+CFI).These results show that RW+SS+CPH+CFI imposes 1.12% larger overhead on
latency but 0.60% lower overhead on bandwidth.
Table 4.4 shows the performance overhead of both schemes when measured on PTS.
CFI imposes an average overhead of 2.19% with RW+SS+CPH+CFI exhibiting a slightly higher
average overhead of 2.74%. Both schemes impose their largest overhead on PostMark.




In this dissertation, we investigated the hypothesis that the security of modern OSes can be
improved by adopting self-protection mechanisms specifically tailored to the kernel setting
that minimize the set of code pointer an attacker can tamper with to reliably mount code
reuse exploits.
Towards this goal, we presented kR^X: a comprehensive and practical solution against
code reuse attacks that target x86 and x86-64 Linux kernels. To prevent simple code reuse
exploit attempts it relies on strong code diversification (function and code block permuta-
tion). It then instruments every memory read instruction with SFI-inspired range checks
which render the loaded code unreadable, thus thwarting direct JIT code reuse attacks.
Finally, it protects return addresses through two novel schemes —one based on encryption,
the other based on deception— to tackle indirect JIT code reuse exploits. Finally, it takes
advantage of new hardware features (i.e., Intel MPX) or architectural characteristics (i.e.,
segmentation unit on x86) to reduce its performance overhead. Our extensive evaluation
demonstrates that kR^X can effectively and eﬀiciently protect kernel software from code
reuse attacks with low overhead.
In addition, we presented kSplitStack: a solution that further hardens x86-64 Linux
kernel software against indirect JIT code reuse attacks. It solves the race hazards limitations
of the return address protection schemes of kR^X through the use of a (specially crafted)
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shadow stack. Specifically, it enforces race-free return address protection by relocating the
stack pointer before the call through a novel code instrumentation scheme. Additionally,
it protects hardware emitted code pointers (and other control data) in interrupt context
through the use of x86-64 architectural features (i.e., IST). Our experimental evaluation
shows that it provides stronger protection against code reuse attacks than kR^X with
similarly low overhead.
5.2 Future Directions
The works we presented improve the current stature of OS kernels from a security standpoint
however they are far from suﬀicient to guarantee the security of kernel software. There are
many more threats that need to be addressed by the security community. Over the next
few paragraphs we discuss some directions that researchers should consider moving towards
the next-generation of OSes.
5.2.1 Current and Future Threat Mitigation
Software and more specifically kernel security has been revolving mostly around control
flow hijacking attacks, due to either the weak kernel-user segregation [109] or the ability
to “repurpose” already existing, legitimate code to perform malicious actions. We believe
that the combination of the various defenses in modern systems [43, 82] along with the
defenses proposed by the research community [50, 79, 83, 89, 109, 129, 146, 157] and the
solutions presented in this dissertation raise the bar significantly. We anticipate that at-
tackers will migrate to different types of attacks which have escaped the attention of the
research community, either as stepping stones to bypass deployed defenses or as new attack
vectors.
One such threat is data-only attacks [27], which target non-control data. The kernel
contains multiple sensitive data structures which can be used both to elevate the privileges
of attacker controlled processes (e.g., process credentials), undermine the secrecy of cryp-
tographic keys that reside in the kernel portion of the address space or to disable/bypass
defenses (e.g., page tables, control registers). Both attackers [127] and defenders [26, 52, 53]
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have started exploring this space, however we believe that there is room for more principled
solutions. One option is Data-Flow Integrity [24, 176], however current state-of-the-art
prototypes exhibit significant overhead. One potential avenue of research would be to place
sensitive data structures in isolated regions (similar to the ones of kR^X and kSplitStack) in
order to prevent their corruption. As evidenced by our evaluation, this would be suﬀiciently
practical and effective. A potentially less invasive solution could rely on Process-Context
Identifiers (PCIDs) [104] to protect sensitive data structures by rendering them unmapped
to processes that try to access them through a non-legitimate path.
Another line of attacks that rapidly gain momentum and notoriety is micro-architectural
side channel attacks [93, 99, 114, 134, 188]. Such attacks take advantage of vulnerabilities
in the implementation of various aspects of processors and leak information without “ac-
cessing” them. We believe that since such attacks rely on hardware vulnerabilities, they
are not easily mitigated by software (though specific exploits can be prevented [43, 92]),
however detecting such attacks could be feasible. We envision a kernel subsystem that
would sample various processor counters (e.g., through perf [110]) every few milliseconds
and pass this information to an anomaly detection Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [75].
While imprecise this mechanism could provide valuable information to detect and pinpoint
such attacks.
5.2.2 Security as a Design Principle
More often than not, security mechanisms are added on top of kernel software instead of
being “engrained” in the design. Unfortunately, this paradigm favors attackers: vulnerable
systems are patched only after attackers expose and exploit their weaknesses. We envision
a holistic approach that would place security in the same priority as eﬀiciency and cor-
rectness. Microkernels [95], despite their excessive overhead which limits their adoption,
are an example of this approach. Another promising avenue is migrating kernel software
from memory unsafe languages like C to memory safe ones like Rust [138], as showcased for
small kernels [128]. Unfortunately, this would require rewriting an astounding amount of
kernel code (Linux kernel v5.2 consists of approximately 18 millions LOC), which makes it
a less compelling option. Due to the above, we believe that the community should focus on
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designing compiler-based defenses which can produce lightweight defenses on legacy code.
Making compiler-based security solutions part of the kernel software design and effectively
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Appendix A
Discovered Kernel Bugs
During the development of kR^X-KAS, we discovered two kernel bugs. The first one, which
is security critical, results in memory being accidentally marked as executable. In the x86
architecture, the MMU utilizes a multi-level page table hierarchy for mapping virtual to
physical addresses. When the Physical Address Extension (PAE) [101] mode is enabled,
which is the default nowadays as non-executable protection is only available under PAE
mode, each page table entry is 64-bit wide, and except from addressing information also
holds flags that define properties of the mapped page(s) (e.g., PRESENT, ACCESSED). Often,
multiple adjacent pages sharing the same flags are coalesced to larger memory areas (e.g.,
512 4KB pages can be combined to form a single 2MB page) to reduce TLB pollution [60].
This aggregation takes place in the whole kernel address space, including the dynamic,
on-demand memory regions, such as the vmalloc arena, which may enforce different pro-
tections to (sub)parts of their allocated chunks. Linux uses the pgprot_large_2_4k() and
pgprot_4k_2_large() routines for copying the flags from 2MB to 4KB pages, and vice
versa, using a local variable (val) to construct an equivalent flags mask. Unfortunately,
val is declared as unsigned long, which is 64-bit wide in x86-64 systems, but only 32-bit
wide in x86 systems. As a result, the “eXecute-Disable” (XD) bit (most significant bit on
each page table entry) is always cleared in the resulting flags mask, marking the respective
pages as executable. Since many of these pages may also be writable, this is a critical
vulnerability (W^X violation).
The second bug we discovered is related to module loading. Specifically, before a module
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is loaded, the module loader-linker first checks whether the image of the module fits within
the modules region. This check is performed inside the module_alloc() routine, using the
MODULES_LEN macro, which holds the total size of the modules region. However, in 32-
bit (x86) kernels this macro was mistakenly assigned its complementary value, and hence
the (sanity) check will never fail. Fortunately, this bug does not constitute a vulnerability
because a subsequent call to __vmalloc_node_range() (which performs the actual memory
allocation for each module) will fail if the remaining space in the modules region is less than
the requested memory (i.e., the size of the module’s image).
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Appendix B
kSplitStack Performance on Legacy
Hardware
In this section we discuss the performance of kSplitStack when MPX support is not available.
We employ the same testbed as in Section 4.6 but instead of using the MPX-based range
checks, we employ the SFI (O3) range checks (Section 3.4).
Table B.1 summarizes our LMBench results. Instrumenting only memory writes (W)
incurs an overhead of up to 14.92% (avg. 4.68%) on latency and 4.97% (avg. 1.47%) on
bandwidth. Contrary to the results when MPX support is enabled, instrumenting both
memory reads and writes (RW) increases the overhead up to 25.94% (avg. 8.77%) on latency
and up to 9.77% (avg. 3.51%) on bandwidth. This implies that the overhead of the SFI
range checks is large enough to not be affected by the aggressive check elimination optimiza-
tion. When this isolation instrumentation is coupled with the kSplitStack return address
protection instrumentation (RW+SS), the overhead raises to up to 39.08% (avg. 17.65%) on
latency and up to 8.13% (avg. 4.77%) on bandwidth, which is approximately the sum of
its two components (RW and SS). Finally, when coupled with the CPH code diversification
scheme (RW+SS+CPH) the overhead raises slightly to a maximum of 39.25% (avg. 18.09%)
on latency and a maximum of 9.01% (avg. 4.61%) on bandwidth, while when coupled with
fine-grained KASLR (RW+SS+KASLR) the overhead raises more to a maximum of 45.75%
(avg. 20.97%) on latency and to a maximum of 10.79% (avg. 5.37%) on bandwidth.
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syscall() ~0% ~0% 4.44% 3.58% 3.92%
open()/close() 11.12% 25.94% 39.08% 39.25% 45.75%
read()/write() ~0% 19.01% 29.76% 29.24% 31.55%
select(10 fds) ~0% 10.92% 20.38% 20.66% 22.21%
select(100 TCP fds) 3.38% 5.17% 1.80% 4.98% 8.88%
fstat() ~0% ~0% 9.88% 10.02% 13.06%
mmap()/munmap() 1.66% 1.08% 9.45% 9.27% 10.53%
fork()+exit() 6.46% 8.62% 12.90% 18.95% 23.11%
fork()+execve() 12.53% 2.62% 26.64% 23.42% 32.27%
fork()+/bin/sh 14.92% 17.83% 28.65% 26.49% 32.64%
sigaction() 0.10% 0.55% 7.73% 7.34% 8.34%
Signal delivery 5.16% 10.11% 22.27% 21.66% 23.33%
Protection fault ~0% 1.59% 3.61% 6.37% 6.67%
Page fault 8.92% 6.33% 17.41% 17.27% 19.28%
Pipe I/O 3.89% 13.71% 15.69% 16.49% 16.81%
UNIX socket I/O 4.20% 13.60% 25.01% 27.17% 28.59%
TCP socket I/O 7.19% 11.91% 14.49% 16.47% 21.86%






Pipe I/O (bandwidth) 2.34% 4.67% 7.95% 6.63% 7.51%
UNIX socket I/O (bandwidth) ~0% 2.32% 4.32% 4.21% 4.29%
TCP socket I/O (bandwidth) 4.97% 9.77% 8.13% 9.01% 10.79%
mmap() I/O (bandwidth) 0.06% 0.09% 0.03% ~0% 0.09%
File I/O (bandwidth) ~0% 0.69% 3.45% 3.20% 4.19%
Table B.1: kSplitStack runtime overhead on the LMBench micro-benchmark (% over vanilla
Linux; no MPX support).
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Benchmark Metric W RW RW+SS RW+SS+CPH RW+SS+KASLR
Apache Req/s 3.90% 3.34% ~ 0% 0.98% 1.84%
PostgreSQL Trans/s 5.25% ~ 0% 2.66% 1.04% ~ 0%
Kbuild sec 0.29% 0.77% 1.61% 1.94% 2.69%
Kextract sec ~ 0% 0.26% 0.26% 0.89% 0.80%
GnuPG sec ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% 0.11% 0.10%
OpenSSL Sign/s ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% 0.01% ~ 0%
PyBench msec ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% 0.07%
PHPBench Score ~ 0% ~ 0% 0.01% ~ 0% ~ 0%
IOZone MB/s ~ 0% 4.22% 14.27% 12.50% 12.67%
DBench MB/s 2.63% ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0% ~ 0%
PostMark Trans/s 6.96% 13.98% 23.07% 22.81% 25.41%
Average 1.73% 2.05% 3.81% 3.66% 3.96%
Table B.2: kSplitStack runtime overhead on the Phoronix Test Suite (% over vanilla Linux;
no MPX support.)
Table B.2 summarizes our PTS results. Instrumenting only memory writes (W) incurs
an average overhead of 1.73%, while when instrumenting both memory reads and writes
incurs an average overhead of 2.05%. When coupled with the return address protection
scheme of kSplitStack (RW+SS) imposes an average overhead of 3.81%. Mirroring the results
when MPX support is available, RW+SS+CPH lowers the average overhead to 3.66% and
RW+SS+KASLR slightly raises it to 3.96%.
